of the changes in wetlands impacts justifies a supplemental environmental impact statement and supplemental NEPA and SEPA review process.

 

None of the various revisions of the applicant’s wetland assessment and impact analysis [i] [ii] [iii] include any substantive discussion of the impacts of removal of these wetlands on water quality in Miller, Walker or Des Moines Creek.  Section 4.3.4 in the latest iteration of the Port’s BA limits discussion of impacts to riparian areas near Miller Creek to two brief paragraphs that begin with the bald assertion "Negative Impacts to the riparian wetlands will not occur."  Section 3.1.3 (p.3.11) of the document then takes a "blame the victim" approach toward the existence of riparian wetlands near the proposed project and states: "Riparian wetlands may act as sediment source due to bank erosion that often occurs during periods of high stream flow."  We would add, yes, this is probably true and a good reason not to allow a project that would deposit 20 million cubic yards of material upstream providing sediment and destroying these and adjacent riparian wetlands.

 

4.1.1.     Wildlife Hazard Management

The Wildlife Hazard Management Plan [iv] submitted by the project proponent contains no analysis of historical incidences of bird strikes at Sea-Tac airport.  The lack of any historical record of bird-aircraft strike hazard (BASH) at Sea-Tac indicates the FAA's alleged objection to in-basin mitigation of wetlands destroyed by the Port of Seattle's proposed projects is unfounded.

 

It is reasonable for the agencies considering this issue to compare data concerning the bird-strike issue with records collected by agencies to adopt a regulatory framework.  We are astonished to hear that the FAA is apparently not interested in such data. [v] 

 

We are additionally concerned the project proponent has not considered provisions of the FAA Advisory Circular concerning hazardous wildlife attractants that are particularly applicable in this situation:

 

Exceptions to locating mitigation activities outside the separation identified in the siting criteria may be considered if the affected wetlands provide unique ecological functions, such as critical habitat for threatened or endangered species or groundwater recharge.  (AC 150/5200-33, Section 2-4.b (3))

 

4.2.  Alternatives

4.2.1.     No Build Alternative

A 'no-build' alternative is a "practicable alternative" and would be less damaging than the Applicant's Project, & at least as effective.  Every federal agency is obligated "to minimize the destruction, loss, or degradation of wetlands, and to preserve and enhance the natural and beneficial values of wetlands in carrying out the agency's responsibilities for ... providing Federally undertaken, financed, or assisted construction and improvements."  Federal agencies are prohibited from providing funding or other assistance for the construction of projects in wetlands unless they find "(1) that there is no practicable alternative to such construction, and (2) that the proposed action includes all practicable measures to minimize harm to wetlands which may result from such use." 

 

Section 404 of the Clean Water Act requires that anyone proposing to discharge dredged or fill material into navigable waters must first obtain a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ('Corps'). "Navigable waters" are defined as "waters of the United States," which have been interpreted by the Corps to include "wetlands."  Because construction of the proposed third runway and associated Master Plan Update development actions would affect wetlands, these actions cannot be undertaken unless it is affirmatively determined (a) that there is no practicable alternative to such construction; and (b) that the proposed action includes all practicable measures to minimize harm to wetlands which may result.

 

Since the close of comments on the prior application, two important groups of additional facts have come to light bearing on the need for the Project.  These new facts, taken together with facts previously known, make it wrong to grant the certification and permit sought by the Applicant

 

4.2.2.     The Alleged Delay Problem is Non-existent 

As a matter of relevant background, before coming to the new facts, it is important to realize that the alleged ‘delay’ problem is non-existent, or at least not proven to exist.. 

 

One way of thinking about this issue is as follows.  First, settle on a definition of ‘delay’ that is reasonable, that the airlines agree with, that commercial air travelers would view as reasonable, and that can be measured at Sea-Tac Airport & other major airports in the U.S.  The definition should be designed to capture & report separately data on elements of ‘delay’ that are attributable to poor weather at Sea-Tac and to capture & report separately elements of ‘delay’ that are NOT attributable to poor weather at sea-Tac.  Second, reach agreement on a way to define all other delays, as air travelers and airlines experience delay, & to agree on a way to measure such delays.  It is important to be able to distinguish between & to compare (a)  Sea-Tac related delays that arguably would support the proposal for another runway, (b) Sea-Tac related delays that cannot be cured by construction (such as passengers’ difficulties in reclaiming baggage), and (c) delays that are experienced by Sea-Tac travelers that are not Sea-Tac related.  It is essential to have some means of comparing the various types of delay with one another, for purposes of costs-benefit analysis, for ensuring that huge amounts of money are not spent on problems that are either relatively unimportant or that could be dealt with by other, less-costly, less-damaging methods.  Third, do a trial run on data collection.  It would be useful to run the model or measurements at several other airports simultaneously with the Sea-Tac experiment, to ensure that no significant block of delay related to more than one airport (as, delays on a flight from Chicago to Sea-Tac) is being omitted & likewise to ensure that individual delay elements are not double-counted.  Fourth, after review of a sample measurements & necessary refinement in the model, do the work again & subject it to public comments, to ensure that the method has public acceptance & credibility.  It will be seen later in this discussion that the method for measuring delay that the proponents used in this instance does not meet any of the criteria suggested here, & is of dubious value.

 

What actually happened was that the proponents of the Project have trotted out vast claims of delay (never supported by independent studies, or any public process to develop such studies).  The general public, & relevant planning agencies, were expected to accept the claims without criticism or comprehension.  The methodology, if any, for making these claims was not revealed.  The methodology for making claims of dollar savings was not revealed.  Delay was undefined.  A project originally costing $225 million was to be approved on the basis of mere assertions.

 

The claims as to extent & cost of ‘delay’ made by the proponents were so great as to defy common sense.  Seemingly, commercial airlines were losing hundreds of millions of dollars.  Airlines were pig-headedly incurring vast losses to fly into Sea-Tac, & were doing nothing to change their ways in order to avoid those losses.  This analysis on its face was unreasonable.

 

Therefore, RCAA has pressed hard throughout the history of the third-runway effort for (1) a definition of 'delay' as the FAA & Port use it for purposes of justifying the Project, (2) a rational explanation of the proponents' position that measures short of construction will not meet the problem -- whatever it is;  (3) a reasoned cost-benefit analysis. 

 

Ecology should also seek understanding on these topics.  It would be inappropriate to grant a permit on the basis of unexamined, unexplained claims by the Project’s proponents.  Unless actual delay can be demonstrated, there is NO justification for the filling of wetlands, for the expenditure of hundreds of millions of public dollars.  In this regard, it will be helpful to consider the last round of dialogue on this point -- RCAA Comments on the point in the FEIS, and the responses of the Port and FAA.  The first comment to consider is the one in which we sought to learn how "delay" was measured.

 

Comment II-39: Purpose & need;  measuring delay.  It is entirely unclear from Chapter II of the DEIS which techniques were used to measure or to assess delay at Sea-Tac in the various studies mentioned.  We are aware of three different techniques, known as ATOMS, ASQP, & SIMMOD, & that they yield very different results as to delay.  But the details of each are unclear to us, & the average lay reader of the DEIS would not have a clue that there are competing measurement or assessment methods, or that different studies have produced different results.  What is measured?  Who does the measuring?  Are various causal factors considered?  reported?  Who decides whether a delay is caused by weather, by aircrew problems, by groundside problems?  What happens if one delay has multiple causes?  What happens if no one is sure what cause was?  At a minimum, the FEIS should pull up from the studies on which the lead agencies rely sufficient detail to enable the intelligent lay reader to know what was done, why, & how, to measure the delay, & to understand what the controversy is about the results reported in the DEIS, & why the DEIS & FEIS accept a particular set of figures.

 

(In this context, we respectfully suggest that the reviewers of the Corps and Ecology are in much the same position that our review teams are & have been:  intelligent but lay readers, dependent on the 'experts' to provide accurate, understandable information.)  We thought (& still think) that our Comment II-39 was a reasonable comment, deserving of a forthcoming response.  But this is what we got:

 

Comments R-3-17:  The Regional Commission on Airport Affairs and Mr. Frause asked several questions concerning the definition of delay.

 

Response:  Aircraft delay is one measure of the operating efficiency or performance of an airport system or its various components.  It is defined as the difference between the actual time required for aircraft to pass through the system (or a component of the system, like the enroute airspace) and the optimal time achievable without constraints such as poor weather at the destination airport, lack of adequate runway or taxiway facilities, or airspace interactions with other airports.  Aircraft delay results from multiple aircraft competing for limited facilities and can be influenced by a number of factors, such as:

 

            ·           Ceiling and Visibility Conditions

            ·           Airfield Physical Characteristics

            ·           Air Traffic Control Procedures, and

            ·           Aircraft Operational Characteristics

 

 

When dealing with aircraft delay, it is important to understand that aircraft are often delayed at a location that is not the source of the delay.   By means of FAA Central Flow Control Procedures, aircraft are routinely held at the origin airport rather than in airspace holding patterns during periods of reduced arrival acceptance rates at the destination airport.  Accordingly, when weather conditions in Seattle [sic] preclude the use of dual approaches, aircraft destined for Sea-Tac are held either at the gate or on the airfield of the origin airport.  Such delays are often attributed to the departure from the origin airport, rather than the arrival into Sea-Tac Airport. (emphasis added)

 

The metrics used to measure delay vary widely and depend on the intended use of the data.  For example, the FAA’s Air Traffic Operations System (ATOMS) is an operational and tactical planning tool used to support decisions about real time air traffic control procedures and the deployment of air traffic control personnel and other resources.  As such, ATOMS, is used to collect data on the number of flights delayed 15 minutes or more during any one of the four stages of flight: departure, air traffic management, enroute, and arrival.  These four segments coincide with the air traffic control division of workload used throughout the National Airspace System (NAS).  For example, a flight that incurs 14.5 minutes of delay in the departure phase, 14.5 minutes of delay due to air traffic management, 14.5 minutes enroute and 14.5 in the arrival phases (a total flight delay of 58 minutes) would not be counted as a delayed flight using the ATOMS methods.  Since ATOMS was not designed to assist with decisions about airport improvements, such as the proposed new runway at Sea-Tac Airport, it does not provide useful information about the source of a particular delay, nor does it quantify the aggregate minutes of delay experienced throughout the NAS due to constraints at a particular facility.

 

On-time performance, as reported through Airline Service Quality Performance (ASQP), is another measure of system performance that is often confused with delay. 

 

So, on the basis of that response, what measure of delay was being used by the proponents, & how was delay defined?

 

We suggested in our Comment II-35 to the Master Plan Update DEIS that air carriers would not behave in an irrational manner by forcing peak-period flights with serious delays, but would, rather, spread their flights, compress their passenger loads, & in other ways behave sensibly.  Thus, projecting crowding & costly delays without taking into account the predictable behavior of the players was & is erroneous.  The proponents’ response to that (Response 4-7) was that demand-management alternatives were discussed in the Flight Plan EIS -- by no means the same thing! 

 

Our Comment II-36 suggested "that a combination of higher load factors, a modest increase in flights using the existing two-runway configuration, high-speed rail travel, technical advances, etc." would accommodate the projected boarding increases found in the Master Plan.  The Response only addressed high-speed rail, & found that non-feasible on the basis of the decision of the Expert Arbitration Panel on that point (the Panel's order of 8 December 1995).  The Response failed to notice that the reason for the Panel's conclusion was that there was no entity pushing for high-speed rail in Washington; the Response failed to note that directly after that order was released the Department of Transportation changed position radically, & announced a whole series of initiatives for increasing high-speed rail travel -- i.e., the problem that concerned the Panel had essentially gone away.  So, we repeat: a combination of higher load factors, a modest increase in flights using the existing set-up (20,000 per annum), increases in rail travel (especially high-speed rail), technical advances in aviation should suffice to obviate bad-weather arrival delay.  We would add that administrative measures post arrival at the Airport, aimed at speeding the departure of arriving passengers would work wonders in terms of reducing the actual delays experienced by incoming travelers.  This is the least costly way of dealing with the problem – if it exists.

 

4.2.3.     Technological Improvements Considered

Ecology must consider the use of technological improvements that will permit aircraft landings in poor weather conditions. 

 

Some may disagree with our analysis infra, showing that the 'delay' problem is so ill defined as to be non-existent.  But even if there is some bad-weather arrival delay, the proposed solution to it is not the appropriate one.  Other less costly and less environmentally damaging alternatives are available.

 

The problem, put simply, is that with the existing two major runways being only 800 feet apart, commercial aircraft cannot use both runways simultaneously and independently when aircraft are required by reason of weather to land by instrument rules.  Air-traffic controllers must treat those two runways as part of one system.  And FAA regulations do not permit two jetliners to land simultaneously in poor weather side by side, with only an 800-foot separation.  Much larger separations are required, the amount increasing as visibility worsens.  Even with flight instruments, the FAA for safety reasons requires a substantial separation, owing to the imprecision of the instruments.  The 2500-foot separation between first and third runway is the least distance that FAA will allow under unfavorable flying conditions -- hence the location of the proposed new runway.

 

However, the quality of flight instruments has taken a quantum leap since the inception of the third-runway project.  The best-known new technology is GPS, global positioning system.  The web of 24 Department of Defense satellites around the planet can be tapped to locate a GPS instrument with enormous precision.  The instruments are inexpensive -- ordinary hikers and mountaineers can afford to carry scaled-down versions in their backpacks.  Aircraft equipped with avigational-grade instruments are able to land safely in conditions of zero visibility, and right on the mark.  The instrumentation has been tested repeatedly, with huge success.

 

We include with this submittal a copy of the September 1, 1999 article published in the Wall Street Journal (“Airline Seeks OK on Tool to Beat Fog”), describing the use of global positioning satellite technology in conjunction with navigational equipment now being provided with commercial aircraft, which permits landings in reduced visibility conditions.  This technology has been under development by the air transportation industry for several years and is now being implemented in commercial aircraft at the nation’s airports. The article discusses its proposed use at San Francisco airport where parallel runways are spaced only 750 feet apart, comparable to the 800 foot spacing between Sea-Tac’s runways.  The article reports an FAA operations inspector stating the technology “will be the standard cockpit equipment of the future.”  Ecology must consider utilization of this technology as an alternative to the destruction of wetlands for the runway project.

 

Alaska Aircraft announced as long ago as September 1996 that it would equip the 25 Boeing 737-400s in its fleet with GPS avionics, at a cost of only $10 million.  Coupled with the GPS instruments would new Enhanced Ground Warning System technology (to ensure that the arriving aircraft down exactly at the runway surface.  Once installed, of course, such instrumentation is useable everywhere.  Alaska, it may be noted, is the largest carrier by volume at Sea-Tac.  GPS will solve the bad-weather arrival problem at Sea-Tac, as soon as FAA's rules catch up with technology.

 

Other flight-instrumentation and control technologies are being developed that are independent of the satellite systems.  Best known is the FMS, which permits air-traffic controllers to keep aircraft in extraordinarily narrow corridors, with deviations of only a few feet from side to side.  This technology, too, is available, and like GPS will lead to new rules allowing side-by-side arrivals at distances never before thought feasible.  These technologies have advanced greatly in understanding and acceptance, even since December 1997.  The previously cited article from the Wall Street Journal refers to such additional methodologies as RNP (required navigational performance) and ground-based high-definition radar.

 

At the very least, these & other new technologies mean that a new runway could be built within the perimeter of the present Airport campus, & meet any bad-weather delay problem that might exist.  At best, these technologies should lead to the ability to use the two main runways at Sea-Tac as they now are with the same efficiency in poor weather as now exists in good weather.  Either way, the wetlands filling proposal of the Applicant will not be needed.

 

The Corps and Ecology should require a very clear explanation from the Applicant as to why a technological solution to the delay issue is not being pursued.  The Corps and Ecology should conduct its own study of the issue, consulting with flight-instrument firms (Honeywell and Canadian Marconi, among others), major air carriers, airports where GPS field trials have been conducted, and so on.  For a cost far less than building the new runway (to say nothing of a new terminal and a new people-mover), the poor-weather situation can be addressed, with very little environmental damage. 

4.3.  New Cost Benefit Analysis Needed

The original approvals for the third-runway project were based on cost-benefit work that is no longer applicable, requiring a re-examination of the claimed 'need' for the Project, and of the claimed benefits. 

 

Each of the Project’s proponents has given its own approval to the Proposal.  The Port has done so with a resolution of its Commissioners, with no independent analysis.  The FAA has done so with its “Record of Decision” (ROD), which presented a page or two recapitulating the previous undocumented claims of vast costs to airline and travelers from ‘delay’ (not defined).  Subsequent facts challenge the current validity of that FAA approval.

 

Since the close of the comment period on the original application, much new information about the dollar costs of the third runway has come to light.  First, it has been revealed that at the time of the application, the Port did not have enough cash in hand & grants promised to permit construction on a pay-as-you-go basis.  That meant that the Port would have to borrow money to pay its contractors.  The funding shortfalls and the costs of borrowed money were never alluded to in the EISes or the FAA’s ROD or the Port Commission’s resolution.  As of the time of the earlier application, the cost of the runway was represented as being just over $587 million.  The Port had in hand cash & grant commitments for just $180 million.

 

Second, we now have some real-world figures for the cost of borrowing by the Port for this Project, because the Port has now actually undertaken a partial borrowing for that purpose.  In mid-1998, the Port issued long-term debt secured by future passenger facility charges (PFCs), in part to acquire money for third-runway purposes. On the basis of that application, RCAA performed a simple calculation, comparing amount borrowed with amount to be repaid:  the calculation shows that the Port must pay out $3.23 for each dollar borrowed.  Put in other words, to find out how much the Port must repay, multiply the amount borrowed by 323 percent.  Only part of the money from that PFCs-secured borrowing was intended for third-runway use.  The amount for that purpose was $114 million;  the amount to be repaid on that sum was $369 million (principal, $114 million; interest & other costs, $254 million).  That additional $254 million for interest &c., brought the cost of the Project to $841 million.  But the borrowing still left a shortfall of cash & other funding of $293 million. 

 

Third, after the issuance of the PFC bonds, it became feasible to make a fairly precise estimate of the total cost of the Project, on the basis of the stated construction price of $587 million, using the Port’s actual experience with its PFCs borrowing as a guide.  The results of that calculation show that the total unfunded $293 million in construction costs would turn into a long-term obligation costing $959 million to retire, the original $293, and another $657 million in interest & other costs.  Thus, to buy a runway whose cost was estimated at $587 million, the Port would actually pay out $ 1.499 billion!  These numbers were not before the DOE when the previous application was active.  They suggest that the cost-benefit analysis in the ROD was obsolete.

 

Fourth, the exercise of the PFCs borrowing, together with a host of internal Port documents obtained in the last few months, reveal that the Port is in a serious cash-flow bind as to its capital-construction projects.  This is not a short-term deficit that can be met by short-term borrowing, or some simple ‘tweak’ of revenues.  No, the shortfall is so great that hundreds of millions (more likely billions) must be borrowed, & the terms of the borrowings must extend for decades.  This is not just for the third runway, but for the whole array of proposed construction projects, including the two most closely associated with the runway -- the new terminal and the new 'people mover'.

 

Fifth, in June 1999, the Port admitted to another huge increase in the projected costs of the third runway.  Staff’s June 1999 estimate was $773 million.  We note that was a 31 percent increase from the official figure of 18 months previous.  The Port Commission voted to accept those numbers.

 

Sixth, the new increase in costs of construction necessarily implies an increase in the total outlay for costs of borrowed money.  No new grants, no new cash, have come the Port’s way.  The Port’s financial position having not improved in the interval since the PFC-backed borrowing took place, it is reasonable to suppose that the Port will have to borrow against future revenues for a term similar to that of the first PFCs bonds, & at a similar per dollar cost.  No other scenario has been proposed.  The additional construction costs of $286 million will require long-term borrowing, which will lead to an ultimate payout of over $900 million dollars.  The true cost of the Project now stands at something in the range of $2.1 to 2.2 billion.  Contrast that figure with the $587 million reported to the public and the DOE in late 1997, and one sees that all the cost-benefit work needs to be re-figured. 

 

One further needs to consider that with no source of funding for the new shortfall in view, there is a very real risk that if permission were granted for this project to go ahead, the project will stall out, with the damage to wetlands accomplished but no runway constructed, &, thus, no benefit however debatable conferred on the travelling public or the airlines.

 

These new costs figures should impel the DOE to conduct its own thorough, independent, & credible review of the costs-benefit analysis, and of the ‘delay’ issue.

 

In conducting that analysis, the DOE should bear in mind the point made in our discussion of project piecemealing, § 2.4 supra, -- in order to make the third runway work as intended, the Port must also construct a new North Unit Terminal (estimated to cost $468 million to $498 million as of December 1995), a new people-mover for that new terminal ($75 to $150 million), & (though this may be somewhat optional), a new parking structure to serve the new North Unit Terminal, at a late-1995 cost of $60 million dollars.  Just these three auxiliary projects were estimated (four years ago) to cost a total of between $603 and 798 millions.[vi]  And most of that sum must also be borrowed, on the long term, with a big multiplier to capture the real cost, construction price plus cost of borrowed money.  And, it should be borne in mind, the serious engineering on those supporting projects has not begun, so the serious increases in the original estimates have not begun either.  Based on experience with the runway itself, one would expect the early estimates for these components to triple.

 

4.4.  Benefits and Costs Incongruent

The costs of this Project will not benefit those who pay them, a factor that should be borne in mind in assessing 'need'.

 

The issue of overall-cost, including the cost of borrowed money, is separate from the issue of how the Port might generate a revenue stream that would be an acceptable security for further bond issues.  May we assume that the DOE is aware that financial institutions will not lend large sums of money (we’re talking hundreds upon hundreds of millions here) without some form of security?  For airports owned and operated by Port districts in Washington, there are only a very few forms of security, all of them future revenue streams, as follows:

 

Borne directly by the people of King County

·         tax revenues,

·         future PFCs, &

·         miscellaneous and usually minor revenues from such Port activities as parking garages, charges to concessionaires & non-airline tenants, & other even more minor sources. 

(We attribute PFCs and miscellaneous revenues to the people of King County, because studies have shown that the bulk – though not all -- of the travelers out of the Airport are residents of King County.)

 

Borne directly by the airlines

·         revenue from airlines (normally under their Basic Airlines Lease Agreement with the operator)

 

For cost-benefit purposes, the nature of the revenue is irrelevant, so long as it is reasonably certain:  the differences, if any, between interest rates for bonds based on one revenue stream or another, will be relatively trivial.

 

However, in terms of benefits to airlines & to the travelling public, there is a real difference in how the Project is funded.  (There is no benefit to the taxpayers of King County, as such: if the project is funded in whole or part by tax revenues, taxpayers as such pay a direct price & gain nothing in return.  Federal statutes forbid the Port from returning to the taxpaying public any part of the profit on its airport operations.)  The two alleged purposes of this project are (1) to confer a direct benefit on travelers by reducing their lost time while travelling to Sea-Tac, & (2) to confer a benefit on commercial air carriers by reducing their operating expenses by reducing operational time on flights to Sea-Tac.  (Whether reduced costs to airlines would result in a reduction of airfares charged to travelers is a question that seems not have occurred to FAA and the Port – at least it is not referred to in their numerous volumes of environmental review.)

 

If the Port were to rely on its tax revenues, the funds would come out of the pockets of King County taxpayers.  To the extent that the Port relied on PFCs & miscellaneous revenues, the burden would fall on users of the airport – travelers, in the case of PFCs, and travelers & perhaps others in the case of the miscellaneous revenues.  If the Port were to rely on these revenues, airlines would receive (per the Port’s numbers) very large economic benefits at the expense of others.  Air travelers & taxpayers would buy the Project for the benefit of the airlines, in effect.  Under this scenario, a true costs-benefit study should be restricted to benefits to air travelers, the airlines not having contributed.

 

The Port has repeatedly ruled out use of tax revenues for third-runway purposes.  Its PFCs are already pledged to repay an existing bond issue, far into the next century.  (Even if the Congress were to authorize an increase in the PFCs from $3 to $6, the amount of money that could be raised thereby would be woefully insufficient to pay for the $7 to $10 billion in projected capital projects.)  We have yet to see any analysis that shows that parking fees and surtaxes on espresso can pay for the Master Plan Update projects!  This leaves a sharp increase in the BALA rates as the sole revenue stream available to support the sort of major bond issues required by the Project & associated construction.

 

Then the burden would fall in the first instance on the airlines using the Airport.  It would be pure speculation to discuss how the airlines might re-allocate those additional costs.  Not to the taxpayers of King County, surely, but perhaps to travelers from Sea-Tac.  And perhaps not.

 

There is an intermediate case: If additional PFCs were used, airlines would argue that they would suffer a diminution in revenue, on the generally-accepted premise that demand for air travel is extraordinarily price sensitive, ‘elastic’ in economists’ jargon.  The slightest change in airfare is said to drive with rigidity a corresponding change in travel.  (For the purposes of justifying the third runway, the Port & FAA have advanced a different economic theory: they argue that demand for air travel is completely inelastic.  According to them, on this one occasion, demand for air travel is in a direct, 1:1 proportion to overall economic activity.  Under this theory, the Port can jack up its airline rentals to any level at all, the airlines will jack up their ticket prices accordingly, & the travelling public will come in the same numbers as always.  This might be true for governmental entities like the FAA and Port, but most corporate controllers will not authorize big increases in travel expenses in budgets already adopted.  It is much more likely that a big increase in airfare will lead to a sharp diminution in business air travel to & from Seattle.  Where is the benefit for the scheduled airlines from such a development?

 

Further, if the airlines’ view of airline economics is correct, as opposed to the governmental view, a diminution in revenue occasioned by an increase in PFCs would eat into the economies of scale that are essential for airline profitability.  The Port and FAA have failed to present any analysis of whether putative gains from faster arrival might not be eaten up by losses in profitability resulting from decreased demand for travel.

 

In conducting its own review, Ecology should be cognizant of the expressed opinion of several major airline users of the Airport – this is not new information, but it is increasingly relevant as the true costs of the Project, & additional information controverting the notion of big delays, come to light.  Commenting adversely on the proposal to use new PFC charges for third-runway purposes, airlines had the following to say:

 

·         "United disputes the assertion that a third runway 'is necessary to eliminate a seven minute average delay at the airport' and asserts that 'none of that delay is attributable to the lack of the third runway, but a number of other factors.'  United is of the opinion that 'the airport's estimate that a third runway will provide $60 million of operational savings is not supportable using standard business calculations.' "  [vii]

 

·         "TWA -- in concert with Delta and United -- believes that extending the Runway 16L-16R Safety area, 'instead of building a third runway -- is the best alternative to address capacity issues caused by warm weather and Pacific operations.' " (p.3,op.cit.)

 

Ecology should also be cognizant of the results of a recent study done for National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) of major U.S. airports with parallel runways (including Seattle).[viii]  This study was not available to the public or to the DOE before the close of the comment period on the earlier application.  The study was partly funded by FAA (at the top level), & FAA did not register a dissent from its conclusions.  The study analyzed arrival delays at the airports included in its scope.  What was the report on Sea-Tac?  “Arrival delay factors: None.” (p.48) May we suggest that a study done for independent reasons for an outside agency necessarily has a lot more credibility than a study done by a project proponent for the purpose of justifying a project?

 

If, as RCAA has concluded (& NASA, & several user airlines), there is no demonstrable ‘delay’, or if at the most there is some delay, but not ‘delay’ that cannot be compensated for by administrative measures, the certification should not granted, regardless of conditions that might be imposed on it, for a showing of need will not have been made.

 

If, as RCAA has concluded, the cost-benefit analysis will not stand up in light of the newly revealed true costs of the Project to the Port, the DOE should deny certification, for a showing of need will not have been made.

 

4.5.  Offsite Impacts

The permit should be denied because of the failure of the Application and the Proponents to provide adequate mitigation of offsite impacts.

 

Some of those offsite impacts are obviously environmental, & clearly within the purview of the Corps and Ecology: impacts on Miller and Des Moines Creeks outside the Port’s acquisition area (which includes most of the construction area).  Those impacts include increased contaminants in the waters of the Creeks from construction activities, & from continuation & expansion of Airport activities upstream; silting & sedimentation downstream; flooding downstream, with risks of bank erosions (& consequent loss of property values), harm to stream-side natural habitat, harm to endangered species and candidate species; release of contaminants & sedimentation into Puget Sound.  We will discuss these in detail below.

 

Other offsite impacts are more indirect, & for them no mitigation is proposed.  Operation of a new runway will bring overflights of jet-engine aircraft directly overhead in areas where there have not been such flights in the past.  This will result in new adverse noise impacts, new air pollution (& consequent new water contamination) from jet-engine exhausts, & a host of corollary negative impacts.  Until adequate mitigation is proposed for these impacts (& until the public has had a reasonable opportunity to comment on the mitigation proposals), the permit should be denied.

 

To lend specificity to the foregoing, we note that a prior independent study of potential adverse impacts from the third runway (HOK Study) reported that every instructional building in the Highline School District would likely need major noise insulation work, were a third runway to become operational.  The cited study did not extend to the Seattle School District.  However, a glance at the maps will show that there are schools in the Seattle system as close to the new third-runway flight corridors as the Highline schools, schools also likely to require serious mitigation.  Yet, the Applicant makes no proposal to mitigate these impacts.  The silence of the Applicant on the question of third-runway impacts offsite should require denial of the permit at this time.

 

4.6.  The Wall

1.       Will the Wall work?  An obviously critical part of the Port's plan for constructing the runway embankment is the Wall to contain fill material where the embankment makes its closest approach to Miller Creek.  The Wall is proposed in evident response to criticisms of the prior proposal for essentially unsupported earthen fill.  There is nothing before the public (see our comments infra, sec. 2.3 about the unsatisfactory Public Notice) to show that the Wall has been brought to any appropriate state of engineering.  The information that has come to the attention of RCAA as the result of diligent requests for disclosure of public records and by virtue of the various informal communications that have gone back and forth does not add any confidence that the Wall will work.  Appendix B to the Impacts Analysis document cited in the Notice provides no details, only an indication of various materials that are ordinarily used to build so-called MSE walls.  How any 'experts' can state with assurance that the proposed construction will work, given the paucity of information, is a mystery. 

 

We are aware of the existence of additional background documents for the Wall's construction.  The DOE should take prompt, affirmative steps to put those documents into the public domain.  (Ones that we know about are referenced in section 2.3.13 infra.)  Thereafter, the public should have ample time to review those documents & to submit comments on them.  These documents may contain the missing, needful details of construction -- and maybe not!  In the absence of the detail, the public will conclude that the plan for the Wall is a plan for disaster.  It will not do in this context for experts hired by the Port to come in & say, in effect, "We are engineers and we know best -- even if we don't what the actual method of construction might be!"

 

2.       The Wall cannot be built without violating the standards for construction in the protected (sensitive) areas.  To construct the Wall, construction crews must work adjacent to Miller Creek, and in wetlands.  Damage during construction will be difficult to remedy.  The idea, floated at the public hearing, of building the wall from the back, is hard to accept, & in the absence of any engineering details seems utterly impossible.  As the plan is presented to the public at this time, it is self-evident that construction of the Wall will result in serious environmental damage.

 

3.       Unstable soils.  It is well known that the soils in the construction area are of widely varying quality, and that there is a serious risk that soils where the wall's footing would rest are unsuitable for the purpose, and would need to be removed, to be replaced by more suitable materials.  The notion of building the Wall from the inside out depends in part on an unproven assumption that there are no unsuitable soils that would need to be replaced.  Yet Appendix B to the draft Wetland Functional Assessment and Impact Analysis, at p. 24, concedes that such soils do exist, posing a serious problem.  "Existing soils in the area below the Wetland 37 Wall, below portions of the embankment, and below portions of walls in the North Safety Area, are unsuitable to support load of the new fill and/or retaining wall." Ibid.  Methods of removal & replacement of these soils are then discussed -- though the document is silent as to "overexcavation" would be performed, should the unsuitable soils extend into Miller Creek, as may easily be the case. 

 

It is good to know that engineers know how to remove soil and to replace it, and firm up the area for the planned work.  But how does this provide any assurance that use of these techniques will not result in adverse impacts to Miller Creek, or that there is any sort of plan in place to deal with those impacts when they occur?

 

It is noteworthy that Appendix B warns that "[s]pecification of the final extent and depth of overexcavation to remove unsuitable soils will require additional explorations, which will need to include test trenches and test pits, to be completed after construction access is permitted in the wetland areas to be filled."  (p.24, id..  In a nutshell, they don't yet know what they are doing or how damaging it will be.

 

4.       Seismic hazards.  The lack of information about the planned method for constructing the Wall means that there is a corresponding lack of information about the seismic hazards that the Wall would face.  Does Ecology, will the public, accept the thoughts of a highway engineer from Georgia (where there are no earthquakes) on the stability of a wall in earthquake country?  Where is the seismic analysis of the proposed MSE wall that Ecology's engineer has recommended be performed?