RCAA

Regional Commission on Airport Affairs

19900 Fourth Avenue SW

Normandy Park, WA 98166-4043

Comments Regarding the Port

of Seattle's Third Application to the

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for

Section 404 Permit, Seattle-Tacoma

International Airport

- - - -

Comments Regarding the Port

of Seattle's Third Application to the

Department of Ecology for Section 401 Certification, Seattle-Tacoma

International Airport

Submitted by RCAA

Reference: 1996-4-02325

Date:  16 February 2001

Limited Distribution to Authorized Persons Only
Created 2001 and Protected as an Unpublished Work

Under the US Copyright Act of 1976.

Copyright © 2001 RCAA

All Rights Reserved

1.     INTRODUCTION

1.1.            Subject

These are the comments of the Regional Commission on Airport Affairs on the third revised application of the Port of Seattle, as owner-operator of Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, for issuance of a permit to discharge dredged or fill material in navigable waters of the United States, under the provisions of §404 of the federal Clean Water Act.  The present application is a revision of two earlier applications.  Notice of the original application was issued to the public in late December 1997.  The public notice of the revised, or second, application is dated 30 September 1999.  The public notice of the present (third) application is dated 27 December 2001.  These comments supplement oral remarks made on behalf of this commenter by its President, Lawrence J. Corvari, and its Vice President, Allan M. Furney, at the occasion of the joint hearing on the application held during the evening of 26 January 2001 and Saturday, 27 January 2001, at the Criminal Justice Training Center, Burien, Washington.  If granted, the permit would allow the Port to proceed with construction projects at Sea-Tac airport including an additional dependent runway 8,500 feet in length.  The project under discussion in the pendent application and in these comments is commonly known as the third-runway project (sometimes referred to herein as the "Project").

1.2.           Identity of Commenter

This commenter is the Regional Commission on Airport Affairs.  The postal address of this commenter is:

Regional Commission on Airport Affairs

19900 Fourth SW

Normandy Park, Washington

WA  98166-4043

Telcom data are:

Telephone number: 206.824.3120

FAX number: 206.824.3451

e-mail: rcaa@earthlink.net

Website: www.rcaanews.org/rcaa

The commenter is often known as the "RCAA", and that abbreviation will be used hereafter.

1.3.           Interest of Commenter 

RCAA is a Washington not-for-profit corporation.  RCAA is a citizens' group concerned with airport and aviation issues, particularly in King County, Washington.  Its Board of Directors governs RCAA, with input from numerous volunteers and from endorsing and supporting organizations.  The mission of RCAA is to achieve a long-term integrated plan for air and surface transportation to meet the competitive needs of Washington State, and to achieve immediate and permanent reduction in noise and other adverse environmental impacts from commercial aircraft in the Puget Sound region. 

Since its founding, RCAA has been concerned with the future of public air transportation in the State, and especially with proposals for expansion of Seattle-Tacoma International Airport.  RCAA has closely followed and actively participated, to the extent permitted, in such processes as:

·        Port-PSRC study referred to in § 1.6 infra

·        State Air Transportation Commission

·        State High-Speed Rail Commission

·        Expert Arbitration Panel review ordered by the Puget Sound Regional Council (see § 1.6 infra)

·        The environmental review of the site-specific portion of the proposed third-runway project (submitting extensive scoping comments at the start of that process, following with extensive comments on the Port of Seattle's draft and final environmental impact statements (1995), followed by extensive comments on the Port's Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (1997), Port of Seattle 1997.

·        Representatives of the organization have spoken and testified at numerous public hearings, have submitted comments & critiques, and have encouraged others in similar activities

·        RCAA has commissioned expert studies of particular issues & has submitted those studies to appropriate official bodies involved in airport & transportation issues and related environmental issues. 

RCAA has concluded that the Project is deleterious to the general interests of the people and commerce of the State of Washington, and of King County, and that the project will not achieve the goals set forth by the project’s proponents.  The Project is also the least effective & most expensive of the several alternatives proposed for dealing with either the general problem of increased air traffic for the State or for the purported bad-weather arrival delays at Sea-Tac airport.

1.4.           Limited Scope of Comments 

These comments are not intended to be all-inclusive, or exhaustive of the topics that they address.  RCAA relies on the administrative expertise of the reviewing agencies (in this case, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) to be fully aware of the relevant & applicable statutes, regulations, and case law.  RCAA also relies on the reviewing agencies to have appropriate experts peruse all documents in the administrative record with a critical eye, and to call to the attention of the responsible officials in writing, and as part of the administrative record, all matters requiring expert interpretation.  Therefore, we feel it neither necessary nor appropriate to analyze in these comments the entire administrative record.  Rather, it is the intent to focus on issues that are of particular interest to our organization, and as to which we have developed our own body of expertise over the years.  We do not profess legal expertise, nor expertise as to soils science, geo-technical and seismic issues, environmental engineering, or construction of very large retaining walls; as to those subject areas, we adopt as our own, by this reference, the comments of the Airport Communities Coalition.  RCAA does have institutional expertise on air-transportation-planning issues (including "delay" and capacity) and on water-quality and other environmental issues in the Highline area (the part of King County immediately surrounding Sea-Tac Airport).

1.5.           Notes, Glossary, References, etc. 

1.5.1.    Notes & references

Literature and documents relied on are listed in the endnotes to our comments on the second application, and those endnotes are incorporated herein by this reference.  

1.5.2            Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in the text:

1.5.2.    Glossary

Most technical terms used in these comments are self-explanatory in the context of these proceedings.

1.6.              History

It is useful to bear in mind that the proposed third-runway project dates back to 1989.  The Port, in consort with the Puget Sound Regional Council and the local FAA office, has prepared various papers attempting to justify the Project, & other capital-construction projects at the Airport.  At every stage, the Port has dominated the selection of consultants, the preparation of reports and environmental reviews, and the deliberations of the notionally independent bodies that have given planning approval for the project.  At no time has the Port actually considered any alternative other than construction of the third runway and the very costly projects associated with it.  The consideration of alternatives has been tainted by the Port’s single-minded dedication to its proposed project alone, through the Port's use of unsubstantiated assertions, questionable methods, and dubious statistics.  The only independent review of the project (by the Expert Arbitration Panel in March 1996) resulted in a denial of approval based on environmental, fiscal, and scientific considerations.

Topography in the area surrounding Sea-Tac airport prohibited the construction of Sea-Tac's second runway at the location originally proposed.  Instead Sea-Tac's second runway, completed in 1972, was built only 800 feet West of (& parallel to) the airport's existing runway.  At the time, the Port's Director of Aviation stated that construction of a runway any farther West was not possible because of the topography of the area.  The Port of Seattle restated this position when it completed Sea-Tac Airport's Master Plan Update in 1985, which concluded, "new runways will not be considered.  Reasons cited for this policy in the Master Plan update included "environmental constraints." (pp. 5-1, 2-1-2)

2.          PROCEDURAL ISSUES

There are various procedural issues & concerns in these proceedings.  One affects the extent to which we repeat here the substance of earlier comments, and that is discussed in sec. 2.1.  The other procedural issues challenge the integrity of the process for evaluating the pendent application & they are discussed in sec. 2.2 & seq. he following sections. Cumulatively, they suggest that the Application, like its predecessors, is premature, and that the public-notice process and administrative-review process each are fatally flawed.  The Application should be withdrawn (or denied without prejudice), and a new or revised application filed, and a more adequate notice issued, when all relevant documents have been lodged with the Corps and Ecology.  The new notice should list all relevant documents, and all such documents should be freely available for review by outside parties.

2.1.      The Scope of Current Review

Although the Port's application under the provisions of §§ 401 & 404 of the federal Clean Water Act was withdrawn, the Corps' notice treats it as if it were simply revised during the period allowed by law for its review.  Ordinary people would understand that if an application has been withdrawn, its useful life has ended, and that any further application would be a new application, triggering new public notice, new public hearing, a new review period with new deadlines for action by various parties, &, in general, a new review.  Here, a new notice has been issued, with a new public hearing, a new deadline for submission of written comments, and a new timetable for review.  But, we are told; the ONLY things to be considered are so much of the new application as are different from the last prior application.  We believe that the Corps' analysis of the procedural situation is in error, and therefore, to protect our position, we will include in these current comments matters still of concern to us that were included in our last prior comments (those of 29 November 1999), modified as changed circumstances require.  Thus, these comments constitute a stand-alone document, incorporating all of our current comments relating to the Project, the current application, and the current notice.  We take it that documents submitted with those earlier comments remain part of the Corps' general file on this matter, are readily available for the use of reviewers at the Corps, and we assume that we do not need to re-submit any documents already in the Corps' possession. 

We make the same assumptions and are proceeding in the same way as to the sec. 401 certification application now pending before the Department of Ecology.

2.2       The Notice

There are serious problems with the Notice that is the subject of these comments.  Members of the public have the right to rely on the Notice as the source of accurate, complete, and timely information about the Application. Anyone so relying on this Notice was not fully informed.  The defects in this Notice are by no means so severe as those that characterized the two previous notices, but they are still serious.

2.3            Accuracy and Completeness

The present Notice, supplemented by personal communications, at last made clear that the Application under consideration was a Joint Aquatic Resources Permit Application (often referred to as JARPA), dated 26 October 2000, & signed by Elizabeth Leavitt, an employee of the Port of Seattle.  However, in some respects, the present Notice was inaccurate to the point of being actively misleading and was also seriously incomplete.

2.3.1.   Incomplete List of Relevant Documents

While this Notice contains a section detailing documents related to the Application (Project Bibliography, p.9), the list is admittedly "non-inclusive".  The public is advised that "[a]dditional information on this project is available in the project files located at the Corps Seattle District Office".  This advice gives no guidance as to the nature or extent of the information in those files, nor guidance as to what in those files is deemed relevant to this Application.  We note that as of June 2000, the Corps' index of materials in its file on this matter ran to 69 pages in hard copy, well over 1200 items.  See the Corps' electronic file {g:/group/excel/corps/corps.2000.xls}.  When members of the public sought to review these files, the Corps advised them that it would be necessary to submit requests under the federal Freedom of Information Act.  This was consistent with policy set during the second review, as we noted in our November 1999 comments, discussing certain documents not listed in that notice, but actually in existence, as follows:

The Corps then apparently took the position that to obtain access to them members of the public would have to submit a request under the Federal Freedom of Information Act  … .  Having to submit a public-disclosure request for such documents is unprecedented.

Our own experience in requesting documents from those files through the FOIA process is as follows:  on 8 December 2000, we transmitted, by FAX, a request for some documents listed in the index, with a back-up hard-copy request mailed that day; the responsive materials were received on 6 February, and then only after follow-up correspondence initiated by us.  That was a 60-day turn-around, & we were fortunate enough to know about, & to have in possession, a copy of the electronic file.  With a comment period extending from 27 December through 16 February, or 51 days, it is apparent that having to go through the Corps' FOIA process would effectively deny members of the public access to the unlisted portions of the file in time to review the same & to make written comments based thereon.  We note, however, that partway through the process there was a change of policy, and the requirement for FOIA requests was dropped.  The Corps announced neither the original policy nor the change in it to the public.

Documents listed & available.  The Project Bibliography refers to six critical documents that were supplied by the Port to the Corps, directly in support of the permit application, & those documents were available to the public in two local libraries (& by non-Corps' efforts, at our offices as well).  These were the most recent revisions of key reports & studies that have been in preparation & revision for many months – a process that began before the first application was submitted.  There is however a major problem with those documents, which is discussed below:

            ESA documents.  Not listed in the Bibliography were: 

--  "Supplement -- Biological assessment for the reinitiation and initiation of consultation for certain Master Plan Update improvements and related actions:  Biological assessment, Master Plan Update improvements, Seattle-Tacoma International Airport ", prepared by the Port's consultants Parametrix, Inc., for the Port and FAA (December 2000)

--  "Essential fish habitat consultation for certain Master Plan Update improvements and related actions:  Pacific Coast salmon essential fish habitat assessment, Master Plan Update improvements, Seattle-Tacoma International Airport", also prepared by Parametrix for the Port and FAA (December 2000).

Wall documents.  A second critical group of documents not included in the non-inclusive Project Bibliography consists of the reports and plans relating to the four retaining walls proposed to be built to contain the 19.84 million cubic yards of fill for the third-runway embankment.  These documents included:

--      (undated) "Third Runway - Embankment Construction - Phase 4, 30% Submittal - For Review Only" (set of almost 250 11 x 17 plan sheets, on such subjects as project phasing, erosion and sedimentation control plans, site preparation plans, utility plans, grading and drainage plans, plans for various ponds, typical grading sections and details, storm profiles, horizontal control plans, 154th relocation, SR 518 temporary interchange, Miller Creek relocation plans, south retaining wall plans, and retaining wall profiles), prepared by HNTB;

-- (undated) "Evaluation of Retaining Wall/Slope Alternatives to Reduce Impacts to Miller Creek, Embankment Station 174+00 to 186+00"

-- (undated) "Sea-Tac International Airport, The Journey Begins Here, The Third Runway," presented by Hart Crowser (Power Point-type presentation sheets, with large type and a few bulleted points per page, plus a few 11x17 drawings (latest dated 5/00));

-- July 1999, "Subsurface Conditions Data Report, 404 Permit Support, Third Runway Embankment," prepared for HNTB and POS by Hart Crowser;

-- July 9, 1999, "Geotechnical Engineering Report, 404 Permit Support, Third Runway Embankment, Sea-Tac International Airport," prepared for HNTB and POS by Hart Crowser;

-- March 20, 2000, labeled Draft, "Subsurface Conditions Data Report, North Safety Area, Third Runway Embankment, Sea-Tac International Airport," prepared for HNTB and POS by Hart Crowser;

-- April 7, 2000, labeled Draft, "Subsurface Conditions Data Report, South MSE Wall and Adjacent Embankment, Third Runway Project, Sea-Tac International Airport," prepared for HNTB and POS by Hart Crowser;

-- June 2000, labeled Draft, "Subsurface Conditions Data Report, West MSE Wall, Third Runway Embankment, Sea-Tac International Airport," prepared for HNTB and POS by Hart Crowser;

-- June 2000, "Preliminary Stability and Settlement Analyses, Subgrade Improvements, MSE Wall Support, Third Runway Project," Prepared for HNTB by Hart Crowser;

-- Memo dated August 2, 2000, to HNTB from Reinforced Earth Company, attaching two Technical Bulletins (re Apparent Coefficient of Friction and Design Method for Reinforced Earth Structures Subject to Seismic Forces);

-- August 31, 2000, "Quality Control Plan for Reinforced Earth Company Design of MSE Walls for Sea-Tac Airport, Submitted as part of the 30% Design";

-- August 31, 2000, "Quality Assurance Plan for Reinforced Earth Company Design of MSE Walls for Sea-Tac Airport, Submitted as part of the 30% Design";

-- September 5, 2000, labeled Draft, "Subsurface Conditions Data Report, Additional Field Explorations and Advanced Testing, Third Runway Embankment, Sea-Tac International Airport," prepared for HNTB by Hart Crowser;

-- September 7, 2000, Draft Memorandum to Jim Thompson, HNTB, from Douglas Lindquist, Barry Chen and Michael Bailey, Hart Crowser, re:  Methods and Results of Liquefaction Analyses, Third Runway Embankment, Sea-Tac, Washington;

-- November 9, 2000, Draft Memorandum to Jim Thompson, HNTB, from Barry Chen, Hart Crowser, re:  Stability Reviews of RECo 30% Design, Third Runway Embankment Project;

-- November 16-17, 2000, "Sea-Tac International Airport, The Journey Begins Here, The Third Runway, Presented to the Technical Review Board," by Hart Crowser (Power Point-type presentation sheets, plus agenda for 11/16-18/00 "1st meeting" of the Technical Review Board, plus two-page list of "Geotechnical Materials for Third Runway Design Review," plus some 11x17 drawings (latest dated 11/16/00));

-- Memorandum dated December 8, 2000, to Elizabeth Leavitt, POS, from Michael Bailey, Hart Crowser, re:  Proposed MSE Wall Subgrade Improvements, Seattle-Tacoma International Airport";

-- (undated) 23 large plan sheets, all labeled Draft;

-- September 1, 2000, "Reinforced Earth Design Calculations," by the Reinforced Earth Company (http://www.reinforcedearth.com/) (262 pages of calculations);

-- September 1, 2000, "Reinforced Earth Design Calculations," by the Reinforced Earth Company (43 pages of calculations and drawings); and

-- various other shorter memos and some e-mails.

RCAA came into possession of the "Wall documents" thanks to others, not thanks to the Corps – we would not have known of their existence from the Corps' Notice.

SR 509 Interchange.  Not listed in the Project Bibliography were

-- the contract between the Port of Seattle and the Department of Transportation, relating to the Port's proposal to build its own interchange on SR 509 at about So. 174th, for the purpose of accommodating movement of third-runway fill material by truck to the site

--  the original construction plans prepared by the Port for that interchange

-- the supposedly modified plans that were submitted in September 2000 to bring (as it was claimed) the original plans into compliance with Ecology's requirements for the interchange project. 

Other documents.  We noted in our comments on the second application that there had been no mention in the second Notice of the Dissolved Oxygen Deicing Study dated August 1999, prepared for the applicant by Cosmopolitan Engineering Group.  That study is highly relevant to water-quality issues relating to this permit and to the companion 401 proceedings, given that deicing compounds from the Airport are universally recognized as a significant hazard to the life forms in Miller, Des Moines and Walker Creeks.

2.3.12.   Incomplete and Inaccurate Documents

Sad to say, even at this writing, the documents that have been identified to date are incomplete and inaccurate.  Further references to incompleteness and inaccuracies will be made seriatim in the discussion of various technical matters infra.  But a few glaring omissions are mentioned here:

1.      Fill.  The problems of mining and bringing fill materials to the site are as yet not adequately dealt with -- where WILL the fill come from?  Will it be contaminated with arsenic?  Lead?  Cadmium?  Other unacceptable contaminants?  What will be the impacts of the mining?  The transport?  The emplacement?  What will be done about the contaminated fill already delivered with the Corps' blessing to the site of the proposed runway at Sea-Tac airport from the Corps' clean-up site near Hamm Creek?

2.      Purpose.  The purpose of the Project is frequently misstated in the papers now at hand, apparently in an effort to make the Project seem more important than it is.  For example, the numerous drawings included in the third Notice state, as did the drawings in the second Notice, that the purpose of the Project is to "meet public need for efficient regional air transportation facility to meet anticipated future demand".  As we pointed out in our last set of comments, this is wrong, or else all the environmental paperwork prepared and submitted by the Project's proponents to date has been wrong.  The purpose – the sole & exclusive purpose -- of the Project, as stated hitherto by the Project's proponents, is to build a part-time, bad-weather, dependent runway to obviate alleged arrival delays;  it has been repeatedly stated by the Project's proponents that the Project will NOT result in increased numbers of passengers or increased numbers of scheduled commercial jet aircraft using the Airport.  "Demand" will remain the same whether or not the Project goes forward.  "Capacity" will remain the same whether or not the Project goes forward.  Thus it follows that the Project is NOT intended to meet future "demand".  This is neither a demand-driven project nor a capacity-enhancing project. 

This was an important issue in the environmental reviews of the whole Master Plan Update.  It seemed to many commenters to defy common sense that a new runway would not result in more air travel, and, thus, in more adverse impacts.  See, generally 6 FEIS Appx T., seriatim.  The FAA and the Port maintained throughout that the new runway would not increase demand, would not increase capacity, and would therefore not create new adverse impacts in such areas as noise intrusion, air pollution from jet-engine exhausts, and depression of residential real-property values.  At best, according to the official analysis, the new runway would reduce some part of the delays experienced by travelers using commercial airlines (and that is a highly debatable point, addressed infra).  On the basis of that analysis, the various environmental impact statements stoutly refused to look at any increased adverse impacts on the general community.  This assertion by FAA and Port has now been tested and upheld in Superior Court and the Court of Appeals, as well as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  Therefore, the present Application is in error in its description of the purpose of the Project.

            If this were a court proceeding, one would say that the FAA and the Port are "estopped" to deny that the purpose, & the sole purpose, of the Project is to reduce bad-weather arrival delay at Sea-Tac. 

The error is repeated in the text of the Notice, at p. 4 under the heading PURPOSE.  The statement found in the paragraph of that section is incorrect & misleading.  Our November 1999 comments called attention to this inaccuracy, & it is distressing to us to see the Corps continuing to promulgate this non-information.  This Project is not about "demand". 

However, if there has been, somehow, an official change of position by the FAA and the Port about the purpose of their Project, then an entire new environmental impact statement is needed, and a new FAA Record of Decision, to consider the Project in the light of a radically different purpose.

A full discussion in support of the official view is found in the first general response by the Port and FAA to the comments on the DEIS, to be found in Appendix R of the FEIS, p. R-2& seq.  (That this subject was addressed in the very first response indicates its importance.)  The discussion is encapsulated in the opening paragraph of part (3) (Conclusion) of Response I, at p. R-5:

(3)            Conclusion

If the proposed new runway and other facility improvements are not constructed, the growth in demand for air travel would continue to occur as would the number of aircraft operations, because it is expected that the Region [defined elsewhere as King, Pierce, Snohomish and Kitsap Counties} will continue to experience growth in population and income.  It is theoretically possible for Sea-Tac to accommodate more than 380,000 aircraft operations per year, even though the accompanying delays would be significant, especially in poor weather conditions.  Therefore, it is the professional judgment of the FAA, the Port and its technical consultants that it is reasonable to assume for the purposes of this environmental analysis that the same number of operations would occur with and without the proposed runway.

Thus, in evaluating this very expensive and environmentally damaging proposal the Corps and Ecology should bear in mind that it is not intended to increase capacity or to meet demand.  The purpose is misstated in the Application & in the Notice.  Whether or not there is a significant delay problem is addressed infra.

2.4.             Piecemealing

Piecemealing is a recurring problem with Sea-Tac Airport projects.  Dating back far before the involvement of the Corps, it has been a problem with this project in particular, leading to public & agency confusion as to the scope & extent of the work, and leading to incomplete & partial environmental review.

2.4.1.   What IS the Project To Be Reviewed?

Let's begin with the big picture. The Port of Seattle has an ambitious plan for huge capital construction projects at the Airport, with a goal to achieve total domination of the Western Washington market for commercial air travel.  This ambition to dominate is clearly expressed in the environmental impact statements published over the last decade.  The projects are reviewed in best detail in Technical Report 8 issued January 1996, which was prepared by Port P&D Aviation as the basis for a portion of the EIS for the Master Plan Update.  We note no reference to that document in the electronic index of Corps materials previously mentioned, and will submit a copy of that report to the Corps as part of these comments.

The third runway is an integral part of this construction program, which includes elements of repair, replacement, upgrade and enhancement, and outright expansion.  The reader is referred to this Technical Report for detail, but some of the significant elements include:

·        Completion of RSA upgrades, existing runways  -- this element, we note, is mentioned on p.4 of the instant notice and on p. 3 of the application

·        Expansion of Concourse A

·        Overhaul of Satellite Transit System

·        New on-site hotel

·        Relocation of So. 156^th Way and 154^th St. So.  – this element, we note, is mentioned at p. 3 of the application but is not mentioned in the analogous part of the notice

·        Midfield overnight aircraft parking apron

·        New FAA air-traffic control tower

·        Adding 1700 spaces to parking structure

·        New employee parking lot [actually intended as overflow storage for car-leasing firms]

·        Changes to interior circulation roadways

·        Expansion of main terminal

·        Another increase in parking spaces at parking structure

·        New hydrant fueling system

·        Various changes in main air-cargo area

·        New runway -- 'third' runway' -- and associated taxiways

·        New airport maintenance facility

·        New North Terminal

·        New people-mover system to serve new North Terminal

·        New North unit parking structure (3000 spaces)

·        New cargo facility for United Airlines

·        A third expansion of the main parking garage

·        Expansion of North unit parking structure

·        More and more employee parking

·        Relocation of Delta's cargo facilities

·        Extension of Runway 34R

This impressive array of capital projects was estimated in the Port's Technical Report No. 8 to have a cost estimated between $ 1,374,459,000 and

 $ 1,420,738,000 dollars, that is between $1.3 and $1.4 billion dollars (depending on selections of various alternatives).  More recent estimates by Port Commissioner Pat Davis and by other Port insiders put the total cost at between $6 billion and $10 billion (statements during the 1999 primary election campaign for Seattle Port Commissioners). 

This long list does not include:

·        Relocation/redevelopment of 24^th/28^th So. (South access road to southern end of Sea-Tac airport site)

·        Extension of SR 509

·        New transit station at Sea-Tac airport (a project of the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority)

·        South Aviation Support Area (SASA)  -- though we note that the SASA project is called out on p. 4 of the Notice & on p.3 of the Application

·        Excavation, transport and delivery of fill material from Maury Island to the Sea-Tac site

·        Other excavation, transport and fill at the Sea-Tac site – though this is referred to in the application

·        Most off-site mitigation

·        The IWS Lagoon # 3 project

A different list, more detailed in some respects, is to be found in Natural Resource Mitigation Plan (Parametrix, Inc.:  December 2000), in Table 1-3.1, p. 1-6 & seq.

The first question raised by these long lists is whether there are work elements that will have adverse environmental impacts that should be studied as a part of these proceedings. We urge that the Corps and Ecology each carefully scrutinize both lists and make an independent determination of construction activities that may impact wetlands or water quality

We submit there are many that have as-yet-undefined cumulative impacts if each of the individual projects proceed.  For example, the SR 509 extension and South Aviation Support Area (SASA) projects are in the same area.  One project proposes moving Des Moines Creek, while the other proposes bridging the creek.  Both projects impact wetlands.  The FAA claims in-basin wetland mitigation is OK for one project and not OK for the other. According to one estimate the SR 509 extension project could impact 12 acres of wetlands.  (The SR 509 extension project should not be confused with the SR 509 temporary interchange project.)  The Corps must consider the cumulative impacts of all these related projects in conjunction with the proponent's application.  While the SR 509 extension is referred to on p.3 of the notice, but no documentation relating to that project is referenced in the notice, and there is no clear indication of the extent to which the Corps will examine the impacts of that project as a part of this pending process.

Similarly, the Department of Ecology must consider the totality of these interrelated projects in considering whether it can properly issue the sought-for sec. 401 certification.  While the technical issues may vary as between the two processes, both must examine and consider all projects, all impacts, and the cumulative effect and interaction of all projects and all impacts.

Next, reviewers should ask whether the Port would be embarked on most of the other projects if it were not pursuing the third runway?  Is the third runway truly intended for the limited purposes established in the official explanations, & nothing more?  It is hard to understand why an 8500-foot runway is being proposed for arrival-only purposes, for almost none of the aircraft now using the Airport or projected to use it in the future require such a long runway for arrivals. [i] And at the same time, the 8500-foot runway is too short to permit many commercial jet aircraft to use it for departures fully laden.  So it is too long for the stated purpose but too short for a more rational purpose.  It is hard to understand why one would pump two billion dollars into the part-time runway described in the environmental impact statements and other publications of the FAA and POS.

Taking the runway project and the other capital construction projects together, the whole package virtually amounts to renovating the existing Airport at great expense and at the same time building an auxiliary, part-time, airport overlapping the original airport both physically and operationally – with no gain in capacity. 

The Airport and FAA have yet to present a coherent explanation, or to describe what their plan for Sea-Tac would be, if the third runway were not to be built.

These circumstances make it an uneasy task to describe just what IS and just what is NOT included in the present application.  Reading the bare words of section 7b of the JARPA ('Application') itself, the only specific items are the third runway, the new runway safety areas for the two principal existing runways, the relocation of So. 154th, certain work in the South Aviation Support Area (SASA), and use of on-site borrow pits (strip mines) as sources of fill for the third runway.  But what about the impacts of all the other projects advocated for by the FEIS?  Or should the Corps be looking even more broadly, to the whole package of “Seattle-Tacoma International Master Plan Update Improvements”, referred to so frequently in so many of the relevant documents? 

One approach would be to include all Master Plan Update components that might have a discernible impact on the wetlands and open bodies of water West of the present Airport, and on the streams nourished by those wetlands, and on the coastal waters affected by the streams, and on other streams draining from the Airport into the watershed of the Green River (Gilliam Creek), and to consider as well the other impacts on the wetlands impending from known or foreseeable activities.  This in the opinion of RCAA is the absolute least that the Corps and Ecology should consider in the pendent proceedings. The expression “known or foreseeable activities” would include the SR 509 extension (referred to on p. 3 of the Notice), the SR 509 temporary interchange (also referred to on p. 3 of the Notice – a project for which no environmental review has ever been conducted by any agency), all other road and highway work in the Miller Creek and Des Moines Creek drainage basins, all mandatory environmental clean-up activities on the present Airport campus and in the real property designated for acquisition by the Port as the site of the proposed runway, or in any other realty acquired for expansion purposes.

The mandatory environmental clean-up activities are particularly troublesome, as will be seen in our detailed comments.

As we understand the present application, it fails to include a number of the elements that the Corps and Ecology should be considering.  If allowed to stand, this will result in piecemeal consideration of what is one single project, and one set of cumulative negative impacts on the streams and wetlands to be protected by the reviewing agencies – but the law requires a co-ordinated consideration of those impacts.  While there is a fine plethora of studies – many of them not described to the general public in the Notice and not all of them actually, readily available for review -- there is not a clear understanding of what is to be examined and what is to be ignored.  Our suggestion in our earlier comments still stands :  there should be a comprehensive conference held by the Corps and Ecology, with the Port, the FAA, the State Department of Transportation, interested municipalities, and interested public groups all participating, to settle definitively what part of the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport Master Plan Update construction projects, associated highway projects, fill-mining, and environmental clean-ups, if any, will be excluded from this review, and thereafter to afford all interested parties a further opportunity to comment.  It needs no citation of authority to state that in environmental reviews ‘piecemealing’ is not an acceptable practice.  We note that 40 CFR 230.10(a)4 provides that NEPA review does not entirely encompass the review the Corps must undertake in reviewing these projects in consideration of the Port's permit application:  more may be necessary.  It seems obvious that the Port is presenting only a portion of the relevant proposed work for environmental review.  This is a glaring procedural flaw.

2.4.2.   A new or supplemental environmental impact statement is required prior to a decision by the Corps and Ecology. 

Another issue that is clearly documented through the recent disclosure of the new projects outlined in the Port's recently application to the Corps and Ecology is the lack of an environmental impact statement that assesses the environmental impacts of the new projects as well as the cumulative impacts of the recently disclosed projects in addition to those studied in the Port's most recent Environmental Impact Statement.  The most recent EIS was issued in early 1997, near five years ago.  Clearly, the Corps is obligated to require an environmental impact that includes an analysis based on the latest planning assumptions.

2.4.3.   Piecemealing the Documentation. 

A rather different form of piecemealing causes severe problems for ‘outside’ commenters, and ought to concern reviewing authorities, such as the Corps and Ecology.  That is the fragmentation of the documentation for the overall project and for the application.  As our discussion of the difficulties with the Notice shows (infra, § 2.1), the more one delves into this proceeding, the more documents not mentioned in the Notice come to light.   (1) It seems impossible to find a comprehensive discussion of the Project in one complete document.  (2) One cannot even find a document that encompasses a complete discussion of the construction of the Wall.  No thanks to the Corps, RCAA is in possession of a boxful of documents about the Wall, as discussed above in sec. 2.3, under the subheading, 'Wall Documents'.  These documents were received on Thursday morning, 25 January, the day before the start of the hearings on the Application.  With all due diligence, they could not possibly be reviewed in time for the hearing, and we are experiencing difficulty in their review in the short period, 25 January to date (thus partially negating the extended comment period).

For the purposes of those with unlimited time to spend, a boxful of documents about the 'Walls' may be fine, but for the purposes of public commenters under a deadline – and, one should think, for the purposes of Corps' and Ecology's management – there should exist a single document containing a complete & comprehensive description, with appropriate references, if needed, to more technical materials.  As it is, one has a week's worth of reading to try to glean what the 'Walls" part of the project amounts to, and only after that can one begin to form an opinion (or to seek an opinion for others) as to what it all may mean.

This piece-mealing of documentation is not a new problem for RCAA in dealing with the Port of Seattle.  For example, during the scoping process for the environmental review of the Airport's Master Plan Update, RCAA filed scoping comments, and in the second bullet point, p.3 of those comments, we besought the Port not to rely on documents and studies that were not properly identified, etc.  Yet, as of the moment of this writing, we know of 10 documents that were prepared for that Update EIS that were not identified to the public in the DEIS, and some of which were not even in print till after the close of the comment period!  The existence of at least one such paper was apparent on close reading of the DEIS, but it was not cited as a reference, nor was there any indication of where it might be available for review.  We commented on that omission in our DEIS comment II-28, (6 FEIS, Appx T, p. 662) only to be told that it was the practice of the FAA to list references NOT in the DEIS but in an Administrative Record.  We learned of this only after publication of the FEIS.  5 FEIS, App. R, response R-1-6, p. R-21.  According to FAA, we should have guessed about this procedure -- why the FAA did not report this at the start of the process, or at the time of publication of the DEIS remains a mystery.  Of course, the FAA's use of that technique did not excuse the Port's failure to disclose relevant documents.  The DEIS was a joint publication of POS and FAA.  In other words, this is not a new issue for us with the Port -- and we see in the instant proceeding that they are still hiding the paperwork.  It will not be acceptable to be informed at some later date after the close of the public comment period that the Corps is building up an administrative record of undisclosed and non-available documents!

In the first instance, this situation is a flaw in the notification process.  In our last comments we suggested that the Corps should prepare a Notice that is accurate and complete, with a straightforward section on references, or included documents.  Fortunately, a bibliography was included in this present notice.  Unfortunately, as indicated above, it is seriously incomplete. 

At a more fundamental level, however, this is the result of piece-mealing by the Applicant.  It may be administratively convenient to ask various experts or consultants (not necessarily the same thing!) to do bits and pieces of the work:  But at some point -- before an application is filed, or when the presentation is to be made -- the work (ALL of the work) should be pulled together into comprehensive documents. In proceedings, including this sec. 401 certification / 404 permit application, the piece-mealed studies should appear in comprehensive documents that are accurately and fully described to the public in the Notice, and all of these documents should be available for public review.  After three attempts by the Port, this simple, needful standard still has not been met.

2.5            Bibliography Problems

A rather different problem in the documentation listed in the Bibliography is the failure of the Applicant or its consultants to provide change sheets or any other guide to advise the reader what has been changed in those revisions of prior documents, and what remains unchanged.  The Corps' Notice was helpful within its limitations, but could not provide a full guide to readers.  It is hard to believe that this failure on the part of the Port was inadvertent.  Given the volume & complexity of the materials, and the short time for comments, the failure causes serious problems to members of the general public.

2.6.           Conduct of the Public Hearing

It is a pleasure to write that the problems with prior public hearings on the prior applications were resolved this time around.  The location was, for the first time, in the affected area that will be impacted if the Project is permitted.  Ample time was allowed for comments.  The facility was large enough to accommodate all those who attended, so that no one was turned away for want of space (as was the case at the previous hearing).  RCAA appreciates the Corps' and Ecology's work in facilitating public comment during the most recent public hearing.

3.          RELATED PROCEEDINGS

3.1.            Related Proceedings Are Pending

RCAA believes it will be useful to refer to other proceedings that are now pending, either closely related to the pendent application or actually part of it.  The final decision by the Corps should await the satisfactory outcome of these other matters.

3.2.            Section 401 Certification

A proceeding related to this one is the application of the Port for a certification under § 401 of the federal Clean Water Act.  RCAA urges the Corps to examine independently any issues that are common to the §401 certification process in this §404 proceeding.  As we will demonstrate, the 401-certification process for the Port of Seattle's application is an extremely problematic issue for the Department of Ecology.  It is common knowledge that Ecology is understaffed, under-budgeted, & under a lot of political pressure to sign off on anything that the Port proposes.  It is also common knowledge that Ecology has a terrible record when it comes to enforcing State and federal environmental laws against the Port.  This is not to fault the civil-service staff of DOE.

3.3.            Hydrology Studies

We find it curious that no reference is made in the Notice to the two hydrology studies funded by the 1999 Legislature.  The first was the study of the impacts of gravel mining on the hydrology of Maury Island, having in mind the application from Lone Star Northwest to King County for permission to institute large-scale mining for fill materials on property that Lone Star controls on Maury.  The other was the study of the hydrology of the Highline district, intended to provide an independent understanding of the potential impacts of the third runway on the aquifers as well as impacts of the proposed fill embankment on local salmon bearing streams.

3.4.           Hazardous Waste Issues  -- On-Site (pre-Project) Contamination

Another environmental issue that must be considered in conjunction with the Port's applications is the situation of on-site hazardous waste including petroleum hydrocarbons, jet fuel, solvents, and other material that exist in areas of proposed construction at Sea-Tac airport for the projects in the Port's permit application.  Petroleum and other contamination exist in at least ten identified locations.  The situation of on-site hazardous waste is well documented in Port and Ecology records.  This situation has enormous implications related to the Port's 401 certification application with the Department of Ecology.  Concerns include the effects of contamination from petroleum and other chemical contamination at Sea-Tac on the regional aquifer supplying the area as well as the effects of these contaminants on water quality in Des Moines and Miller Creeks.  Ecology has noted: "the construction of a new fuel distribution system would be a major component of the airport development alternatives."

This significance of the on-site contamination is especially significant because of the Port's proposed Master Plan program involves the complete replacement of the fuel distribution system throughout the airport with a new "hydrant fueling" system.  The existing fuel distribution system at the airport is over forty years old and has experienced numerous leaks into surrounding soils, utility trenches, and other conduits.  Installation of the new system will require the removal of existing contaminated soils that have been in contact with leaking pipes and tanks. Requirements for proper disposal and treatment must be conditioned as part of this permitting process RCAA has prepared and encloses a memorandum detailing the extent of the on site contamination problem and has included with this submittal references that detail the nature and magnitude of the problem.  The records show the shallow regional aquifer underlying Sea-Tac airport has been impacted by hydrocarbon contamination in six locations at the airport.

We see nothing in the Application or the Notice to provide any assurance that these issues are being contemplated by either the Engineers or Ecology.

3.5.           Hazardous Waste Issues – Newly-imported Contamination

We also have serious concerns with the acceptance of fill material for the proposed Sea-Tac projects that has not been laboratory tested to assure the material is protective of ecological receptors.  As we noted in our November 1999 comments, we have obtained the Department of Ecology's "1999 Airfield Project Soil Fill Acceptance Criteria", a document that discloses that the Port is accepting material from sites that merely have a "supplier certification" that materials brought to the Sea-Tac site meet the MTCA Method A level for Arsenic. The Department of Ecology has acknowledged that fill material that meets Method A cleanup standards is not necessarily protective of ecological receptors.  Therefore it is critical that specific testing requirements be conditioned that require testing at the source for contamination levels and that environmental criteria be established to prohibit the use of fill that exceeds specified levels of contaminants.  We make specific reference to the requirements of 40 CFR 230.60 and 40 CFR 230.61 and note that the Corps must require testing of fill material in accordance with this section associated with wetlands related projects.

The continuous stream of fill material arriving at the site without neither identification of "the source of the material" nor a description of the  "type and composition" of the fill is in direct violation of 33 CFR 325.1(d)(4).

It is disturbing that contaminated fill materials have been knowingly supplied to the Applicant by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers itself.  As of yet, the Corps has not announced any action to undo the harm done or to prevent future shipment of contaminated fill to the site. 

3.8            Proposed modification of existing NPDES permit

This proceeding, begun since the publication of the Notice, is discussed infra at sec. 4.1.2

4.          FACTORS REQUIRING DENIAL OF PERMIT

4.1. Clean Water Act Issues

4.1.1. Port in continuing violation of its existing NPDES permit

Conditions of the Port of Seattle's previous National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit at Sea-Tac airport were modified after its provisions were challenged before Washington State's Pollution Control Hearings Board.  Under the conditions of the settlement agreement pursuant to this appeal, the Port was required to sample stormwater discharges from outfalls on Port property. Subsequently, the Port was defendant in a federal Clean Water Act litigation for alleged violations of conditions in its NPDES permit. Settlement of this litigation resulted in a Consent Decree. Terms of the Consent Decree required additional monitoring of effluent from Port stormwater outfalls.

Since adoption of the additional stormwater monitoring requirements pursuant to the appeal and Consent Decree, the Port has provided discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) that sample parameters of stormwater, including turbidity, total suspended solids (TSS), chemicals including petroleum, copper, zinc, glycols, etc. These reports are consolidated into annual monitoring reports.  We included with our earlier submittal copies of the Port's Annual Stormwater Monitoring Report for the period from June 1, 1997 through June 30, 1998 and for the period from July 1, 1998 through June 30, 1999.  Copies of individual DMRs for stormwater outfalls for the months of April, May and June 1999 were also included with that submittal.  As we wrote in those earlier comments, review of the Port's DMRs shows a consistent pattern of discharges that exceed water quality criteria standards.  High levels of fecal coliform, total suspended solids (TSS) copper, zinc, and petroleum hydrocarbons, etc.  A summary of these exceedences of water quality standards in the Port's DMRs was included with those previous comments.

A recent study evaluated toxicity at several Port stormwater outfalls, no. 002, which discharges into Des Moines Creek, and no. 006 which discharges into Miller Creek.  The results of the study: "Percent survival for D. pulex in 100% effluent was 100% of Outfall 002; percent survival for P. promelas in 100% effluent was 70% and 32.5% for Outfall 002 and Outfall 006, respectively." (p.5) This indicates serious problems of toxicity in effluent from Port stormwater outfalls that flow into Miller and Des Moines Creeks.

We also included in the November 1999 comments a letter dated 15 July 1998 from Lisa Zinner, then an employee at Ecology, discussing stormwater issues and treatment of elevated levels of fecal coliform, copper, and zinc found discharged from Port outfalls (p.6).  

40 CFR 401.15 indicates that copper and zinc are among those pollutants designated as "toxic" under section 307(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act.  40 CFR 122.41 requires that: "The permittee shall comply with effluent standards or prohibitions established under section 307(a) of the Clean Water Act for toxic pollutants . . . within the time provided in the regulations that establish these standards of prohibitions . . . even if the permit has not yet been modified to incorporate the requirement."

We included in our November 1999 submittal for reference copies of the Port's Stormwater Receiving Environmental Monitoring Report and copies of laboratory tests of stormwater for metals including copper, zinc, and lead.  Also included is correspondence from the Port of Seattle to the Department of Ecology concerning toxicity testing of stormwater required under the Port's NPDES permit.

The Port's DMRs, as well as Ecology's correspondence, indicate that the Port is having ongoing water-quality violations of copper, zinc, and lead standards.  Washington's water-quality criteria for toxic substances, including copper and zinc, are found in WAC 173-201A-040.  Some of these compounds are present in the fish of local streams.  Harvests of fish specimens from the upper reaches of both Miller and Des Moines Creeks are showing higher tissue concentrations of toxic compounds.  Also, the lead levels present in these fish, (Pumpkin Seed, Crayfish, Crappy, Skulpin, Perch, and Cutthroat) are approaching the scientific stress point.  It is reported that sediment samples show concentrations of metal compounds above and below Lake Lora (part of the Miller Creek drainage system – see sheet 2, Notice; included within the boundaries of Wetland A1 – see any of the wetlands delineation reports).

The Port's track record is unsatisfactory, and sad to say there is no indication that there will be any improvement at any time in the foreseeable future.

4.1.2. Port & Ecology propose to allow further violations, & to avoid required water-quality monitoring

To add to the Clean Water Act problems, the Port has very recently submitted to Ecology a proposed major modification of its NPDES (or sec. 402) permit.  A copy of that proposed modification and a copy of the Fact Sheet issued in conjunction with it are included as a part of this submittal.  (Omitted in submittal to Ecology, which already has them in hand.) 

·        As written, there are NO requirements for monitoring various pollutants that are subject to control under State water-quality standards;  that is another way of saying that the modified permit would allow violations as to those pollutants.

·        As written, there are NO present guidelines for discharges into the headwaters of Walker Creek – clearly waters over which the Corps asserts, or should assert, jurisdiction.  At a meeting of Ecology with the public held on 13 February at Burien, Ecology's representative, Kevin Fitzpatrick, described the process for the proposed new Walker Creek outfall as involving plans and procedures to be prepared at some future date – after the close of the period for commenting on the modification; those plans would not be the subject of any public notice or other public-review process. 

In fact, as to critical parts of the new permit there is no substance to comment on– it is aptly described by many as a blank check.  We gather that instead of a public process there will be a cozy, private process – perhaps another private "negotiation" between regulator and the regulated, with a Port-paid mediator driving the discussions toward "yes" and the Governor's office leaning over the regulator's shoulder.  We, as members of the public, have absolutely no confidence in such a process.  In the first instance, we believe it is blatantly illegal.  Secondly, it gives a most unseemly appearance even if it is legal.

Therefore, we urge that the Corps cannot possibly accept any sec. 401 certification from Ecology until the litigation about the new major modification has been resolved.  We say "litigation", for there surely will be litigation if Ecology is unwise enough to proceed forward with its present idea of approving a fill-in-the-blanks major modification to the Airport's NPDES permit.  Or, in the alternative, the Corps can rule that Ecology's certification is fatally flawed – as it will be.

4.1.3. Absence of acceptable stormwater management plan

The pending Application is not supported by a "complete" Stormwater Management Plan (SMP) The Port (& consultants) have proposed four or five such plans over the course of the last several years, but even at this late date, according to the best information available to us, the Port does not have an SMP that has been entirely reviewed and approved by the King County reviewers, who are acting for the Department of Ecology on this aspect of the Application.  We note that some Port consultants appeared during the January hearings to state (not under oath) that the SMP now on file would meet the requirements of the County.  We note further that those consultants were NOT on the County staff, and that the Port put forward no-one from the County to support any claim that at long last the SMP meets applicable requirements – King County requirements.

Further work on the SMP flow frequency analysis is needed to thoroughly comprehend and review the stream hydrologic behavior.

4.1.4 De-icing issues

Requirements pertaining to the disclosure of information related to the Port's de-icing study are still incomplete.  Conclusory statements have been provided to regulators thus far, without proper consideration of supporting data -- data yet to be compiled and submitted.  De-icing compounds are various proprietary blends of glycols and other chemicals.  We assume that we need not stress or detail the serious risks that glycols pose to stream life, especially to fish.

4.1.5. Construction impacts not recognized or mitigated

The Application and the Notice each fail to disclose any plan for mitigating construction impacts from construction of the Project-related interchange at SR 509 and So. 174th.The Notice alludes to this project at p.3, reporting that the Applicant says that the work "will not have any direct impact on wetlands or waters of the United States".  The Notice also reports that the Corps has not reviewed "final project plans for the interchange" as of the date of the Notice.  We suggest that the Corps should undertake that review at once – better would have been to done the review before issuance of the Notice.  However, we have reviewed the plans– or at least we have reviewed what have been represented to us as the present plans lodged with the Department of Transportation for its review.  Those plans show that there will be a significant increase in the area of impermeable surface extant in the immediate vicinity of the interchange. The sheets in the TESC section indicate construction of a sedimentation pond East of the SR 509 right-of-way, into which the run-off from the road surfaces, &c., will be directed.  A drainline for that pond will be installed under SR 509, draining to the West, through an outfall – a new, as-yet-unpermitted outfall -- in the headwaters of Walker Creek, into the area shown as Wetland 43 in the various wetlands delineation reports.  This wetland is shown on sheets 3 and 7 in the Notice and on sheet 7 of the Application.  (In the Application, the coding indicates that Wetland 43 had not been confirmed by the Corps;  in the Notice, the coding indicates partial confirmation.)  It seems obvious that a detention pond collecting run-off from an active construction area and a busy interchange for trucks hauling millions of tons of fill is likely to discharge sediments and contaminants of many kinds into Wetland 43, and thus into Walker Creek, thence into Miller Creek, thence into the Sound.  It is good to collect this run-off as the plans propose.  It is bad to discharge this run-off into the headwaters of Walker Creek.  An appropriate mitigation plan is required, but is not presented.  While seemingly a small detail in a large project, this flaw appears fatal to the present Application.

4.1.6.  Stream-augmentation issues

It is generally recognized that the Port's plans will adversely impact stream flow levels in Des Moines and Miller Creeks.  Cf. Comprehensive Stormwater Management Plan, December 2000, sec.6.2.1, 'Low Stream Flow Impacts and Mitigation'.  While that Plan is unclear as to the stream flow problem in quantitative terms, that there is a problem to be addressed comes through loud & clear upon careful perusal:  there may not be enough water in the local streams during dry weather to support native fauna, especially creatures under the protection of the federal Endangered Species Act. 

To deal with the need for new sources of water, the Applicant has attempted to secure it from several sources.  First, it entered into secret negotiations with the Highline Water District resulting in an agreement by which the Water District purportedly sold certain water rights to the Port for stream-augmentation purposes.  Secret deals sometimes bring their own punishment:  when the deal was exposed to the light of day, and folks who actually knew something about the water rights at last had a chance to comment, it turned out that the Water District did not own the rights that the Port purchased.  Next, the Port considered applying to the State for permission for groundwater withdrawal.  That approach appears to have foundered when the Port realized the huge backlog of similar applications, and the serious regulatory problems involved in groundwater withdrawal.  Third, the Port turned to the City of Seattle, seeking to buy Seattle drinking water for stream augmentation.  The negotiations between the City and the Port District have not been conducted openly, but it appears that the Port now realizes that fluoridated & chlorinated drinking water will not do.  Retro treatment of this water to make it suitable for discharge into salmonid bearing streams will be costly and complex to achieve.  (In fact, we've never heard of any other entity using such an approach.)  The Port then shifted emphasis, seeking to buy untreated water from the City.  But these negotiations also appear to have stalled, perhaps in part owing to concerns expressed by Seattle residents at their drinking water – already in very short supply – being diverted.  Now the Port is arguing that it can make up the shortfall with very large upstream detention facilities, which will capture so much rainwater for later release that there will be no problem.  Unfortunately, this approach is not laid out in the documents supporting the Application, so it is not possible to do either a qualitative or quantitative analysis of this latest ploy. We direct the attention of reviewers to the comments dated February 15, 2001 submitted by Rachael Paschal Osborn on behalf of the Airport Communities Coalition for a detailed discussion of the water rights issue.

In conclusion the result is that no certain, secured water source exists for flow augmentation.  Thus, Ecology cannot legitimately certify that the Project will not further degrade an  already tortured watershed.   

4.1.7  Problems with the plan for Miller Creek

The actual design for the potentially relocated Miller Creek stream channel contains a serious flaw.  The new channel width combined with the utilization of pea gravel in the channel bottom will absorb the low flow volume of water currently projected at the most critical times of the dry season.  This will result in the stream drying up and the potential stranding of entire fish runs.  Problems with the design for the relocated portion of Miller Creek are closely related to problems with the four retaining walls proposed as the means to contain large parts of the fill material upon which the third runway would be built.

4.2.      ESA Issues

Early last year, the Chinook salmon (O. tshawytscha) in the Puget Sound area was listed as a threatened species under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA).  The Federal Register notice of 9 March 1998 proposed the designation of critical habitat for Chinook in the area of the Sea-Tac 3^rd runway project.

4.2.1.   Coho Salmon

Puget Sound Coho Salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch) are under consideration for listing as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act.  During the 1998-1999 spawning season 21 Coho salmon redds were identifies in Miller Creek, 66 Coho salmon redds were identified in Walker Creek and 22 Coho Salmon redds were identified in Des Moines Creek.

4.2.2.    Bald Eagles

There is at least one bald eagle nest in the vicinity of the project.  Eagles are frequently seen in the project area, as has been documented photographically.  A consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is required to determine the impacts of the project on the listed species food stocks, prey species (including salmon) and foraging areas.

4.3.           Wildlife Hazard Management

The Wildlife Hazard Management Plan submitted by the project proponent contains no analysis of historical incidences of bird strikes at Sea-Tac airport.  The lack of any historical record of bird-aircraft strike hazard (BASH) at Sea-Tac indicates the FAA's alleged objection to in-basin mitigation of wetlands destroyed by the Port of Seattle's proposed projects is unfounded.

It is reasonable for the agencies considering this issue to compare data concerning the bird-strike issue with records collected by agencies to adopt a regulatory framework.  We are astonished to hear that the FAA is apparently not interested in such data.

We are additionally concerned the project proponent has not considered provisions of the FAA Advisory Circular concerning hazardous wildlife attractants that are particularly applicable in this situation:

Exceptions to locating mitigation activities outside the separation identified in the siting criteria may be considered if the affected wetlands provide unique ecological functions, such as critical habitat for threatened or endangered species or groundwater recharge.  (AC 150/5200-33, Section 2-4.b (3))

It is striking to outside observers, such as ourselves, that the Airport and the existing wetlands have been comfortable neighbors for half a century, but now, suddenly, when the Airport wants to destroy wetlands but not recreate them in the local watersheds, wetlands have somehow become hazardous.  How can that be?  The only rational explanation is that for reasons of economy the Airport wants to provide replacement wetlands of a different character – less extensive in area and with much more open water – than the wetlands proposed to be filled.

4.4.            Alternatives

4.4.1.    Introduction – The dilemma of the decision paradigm

At the outset of each of the two days of hearings in January 2001, the presiding officer (Col. Ralph H. Graves) made prefatory remarks, which if taken literally create a dilemma for commenters and the reviewing agencies alike.  On the one hand, Col. Graves said that the hearing would not debate the pros and cons of the third runway.  On the other hand, he said that the Corps would consider the question of benefit of the project to the public.  We submit that one cannot discuss the question of benefits without discussing the merits or lack of merits of the Project itself.  A project without benefits is without merit.  Most large projects, and conspicuously this one, have detriments, adverse impacts.  The Corps tells us that it is duty-bound to weigh those detriments against benefits.  And thus the public necessarily finds itself addressing the pros and cons of the third runway – the very Project under consideration.

It was clear that the public understood that a discussion of the benefits and detriments was in order.  Most of those who spoke in favor of granting the 404 permit focussed their remarks on economic benefits that would supposedly flow from this grand project, or the devastation that would be wrought if the project were not to go through.  The much larger group that spoke against granting the permit pointed out in detail all sorts of ills expected to flow from the project – environmental harm, continued and increased negative impact on learning in the local schools, and other detrimental effects.  Both groups presented their ideas as to the better ways to deal with the underlying air-transportation problems of Western Washington – certainly a discussion of the pros and cons of the third runway.

We conclude that the formulation by the presiding officer was erroneous.  In order to make a rational judgement about the benefit to the public from this project, one must consider both harm and benefit, and one must do so in the context of the purpose for which the Project is proposed – relief of delays experienced upon arrival at Sea-Tac, to state the matter most narrowly, but in a larger sense, dealing with travel congestion amongst the cities of the Pacific Northwest.

4.4.2.    Were All Alternatives Considered?

The January hearings were characterized by a new theme, introduced for the first time into this extended process by Port allies – that alternatives to Sea-Tac expansion were thoroughly canvassed during the planning-approval process.  As a fillip to that new theme, some supporters of the Project went so far as to claim that there had been full environmental analyses of all alternatives & that such analyses proved that the Sea-Tac expansion choice was the least environmentally damaging of all.  Both statements are fallacious. 

The planning process did consider two alternatives in some detail, and rejected both.  These two alternatives each would depend for its efficacy on the following facts.  As was learned during the planning build-up, there were three critical & interrelated factors at work in creating Sea-Tac congestion, good weather or bad.  One was the very large number of aircraft, overall, flying among the regional cities.  The second was the scheduling by competing airlines of competing flights to those regional cities.  The third was the consequent disproportionate number of relatively small aircraft flying with relatively few passengers on board.  The skies leading to the Airport are congested by aircraft, not by passengers.  So when aircraft fly with light passenger loads, the airspace is being used inefficiently.

·        Demand Management.  The first alternative that might deal with the problem was demand management.  That was rejected as being beyond the control of the Airport (though it is not beyond control of the FAA!).  Comment:  if the airlines involved do not want to restructure their schedules to a more rational arrangement, how does that justify destruction of wetlands?

·        High-speed rail.  This alternative for regional air trips was rejected, as is discussed above, on the ground – utterly spurious in our view -- that there was no agency pushing for its implementation.  But that situation that now has clearly changed, as is noted above.

·        Other airports.  What were NOT considered were alternative sites for newly constructed regional international airports or existing sites for implementation of a multiple-airport system for the Central Puget Sound.  The planning agency prevented such consideration by inappropriate, artificial constraints.

The first artificial constraint on the work was a requirement that only sites in Snohomish, King, Pierce, and Kitsap Counties be considered.  (These are the counties of the Central Puget Sound area, and the counties that are involved in what is now the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC), formerly Puget Sound Council of Governments (PSCOG), the federally mandated metropolitan transportation-planning agency).  Of course, there are 35 other counties in our State, containing many existing airports and many potential sites for construction of new airports.

The second artificial constraint was that certain very large existing airports were excluded out of hand.  One was Paine Field, in Snohomish County, and owned by Snohomish County; Snohomish County's elected officials, conspicuously led by County Executive Bob Drewell (a speaker at the January hearings), simply would not hear of their airport accepting any of the traffic being handled at Sea-Tac.  Another was McChord Air Force Base in Pierce County.  The Pierce County elected officials, conspicuously led by County Executive Doug Sutherland, simply would not hear of any airport in their county accepting any of the traffic being handled at Sea-Tac.  Given that Mr Sutherland and Mr Drewell were the top leadership in the regional transportation-planning agency (PSCOG, later PSRC), it is no surprise that those two capacious & under-utilized airports were struck from the list of possibilities before it was written.

A task force of the regional transportation-planning agency was tasked with examining other potential sites, & did so.  It prepared a short list of sites that ought to be studied, with a dozen potential locations identified specifically.  After their report was in print, the leadership of the Puget Sound Regional Council hurriedly pulled the plug on the exercise, with no examination of the merits of any candidate site.  It will be recalled that Stu Creighton, Normany Park Councilmember, who was a member of the task force, spoke to this very point on the second day of the hearings.  Time is short for dredging up the documentation on what the PSRC leadership did, but if the Corps has any doubts (Ecology knows the story), the Corps should put the burden of proof that alternatives were thoroughly evaluated, &c., on the proponents.  They cannot prove it, for it simply is not so.   If it were so, there would be scoping documents and EISes to prove it.  There are not.  It didn't happen;  it is a figment of the very creative imagination of the Port's public-relations team

4.4.3.    No Build Alternative

A 'no-build' alternative is a "practicable alternative" and would be less damaging than the Applicant's Project, & at least as effective.  Every federal agency is obligated "to minimize the destruction, loss, or degradation of wetlands, and to preserve and enhance the natural and beneficial values of wetlands in carrying out the agency's responsibilities for ... providing Federally undertaken, financed, or assisted construction and improvements."  Federal agencies are prohibited from providing funding or other assistance for the construction of projects in wetlands unless they find "(1) that there is no practicable alternative to such construction, and (2) that the proposed action includes all practicable measures to minimize harm to wetlands which may result from such use." 

Section 404 of the Clean Water Act requires that anyone proposing to discharge dredged or fill material into navigable waters must first obtain a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ('Corps'). "Navigable waters" are defined as "waters of the United States," which have been interpreted by the Corps to include "wetlands."  Because construction of the proposed third runway and associated Master Plan Update development actions would affect wetlands, these actions cannot be undertaken unless it is affirmatively determined (a) that there is no practicable alternative to such construction; and (b) that the proposed action includes all practicable measures to minimize harm to wetlands which may result.

We draw the reviewer's attention to comments submitted by Dr. Stephen Hockaday on behalf of the Airport Communities Coalition dated February 16, 2001.  Dr. Holiday's presentation outlines a range of alternatives to the proposed 8,500 foot runway. Each of the alternatives would take less or no wetland area and eliminate public interest concerns with the proposed 3^rd runway project related to safety, efficiency, the environment, and air ticket prices. 

Since the close of comments on the initial application, two important groups of additional facts have come to light bearing on the need for the Project.  These new facts, taken together with facts previously known, make it wrong to grant the certification and permit sought by the Applicant

4.4.4.    The Alleged Delay Problem is Non-existent 

As a matter of relevant background, before coming to the new facts, it is important to realize that the alleged ‘delay’ problem is non-existent, or at least not proven to exist.. 

One way of thinking about this issue is as follows.  First, settle on a definition of ‘delay’ that is reasonable, with which the airlines agree, which commercial air travelers would view as reasonable, and which can be measured at Sea-Tac Airport & other major airports in the U.S.  The definition should be designed to capture & report separately data on elements of ‘delay’ that are attributable to poor weather at Sea-Tac and to capture & report separately elements of ‘delay’ that are NOT attributable to poor weather at Sea-Tac.  Second, reach agreement on a way to define all other delays, as air travelers and airlines experience delay, & to agree on a way to measure such delays.  It is important to be able to distinguish between & to compare (a) Sea-Tac related delays that arguably would support the proposal for another runway, (b) Sea-Tac related delays that cannot be cured by construction (such as passengers’ difficulties in reclaiming baggage or accessing ground transportation), and (c) delays that are experienced by Sea-Tac travelers that are not Sea-Tac related.  It is essential to have some means of comparing the various types of delay with one another, for purposes of costs-benefit analysis, for ensuring that huge amounts of money are not spent on problems that are either relatively unimportant or that could be dealt with by other, less-costly, less-damaging methods.  Third, do a trial run on data collection.  It would be useful to run the model or measurements at several other airports simultaneously with the Sea-Tac experiment, to ensure that no significant block of delay related to more than one airport (as, delays on a flight from Chicago to Sea-Tac) is being omitted & likewise to ensure that individual delay elements are not double-counted.  Fourth, after review of a sample measurements & necessary refinement in the model, do the work again & subject it to public comments, to ensure that the method has public acceptance & credibility.  It will be seen later in this discussion that the method for measuring delay that the proponents used in this instance does not meet any of the criteria suggested here, & is of dubious value.

What actually happened was that the proponents of the Project have trotted out vast claims of delay (never supported by independent studies, or any public process to develop such studies).  The general public, & relevant planning agencies, were expected to accept the claims without criticism or comprehension.  The methodology, if any, for making these claims was not revealed.  The methodology for making claims of dollar savings was not revealed.  Delay was undefined.  A project originally costing $225 million was to be approved on the basis of mere assertions.

The claims as to extent & cost of ‘delay’ made by the proponents were so great as to defy common sense.  Seemingly, commercial airlines were losing hundreds of millions of dollars.  Airlines were pig-headedly incurring vast losses to fly into Sea-Tac, & were doing nothing to change their ways in order to avoid those losses.  This analysis on its face was unreasonable.

Therefore, RCAA has pressed hard throughout the history of the third-runway effort for (1) a definition of 'delay' as the FAA & Port use it for purposes of justifying the Project, (2) a rational explanation of the proponents' position that measures short of construction will not meet the problem -- whatever it is;  (3) a reasoned cost-benefit analysis. 

The Corps of Engineers should also seek understanding on these topics.  It would be inappropriate to grant a permit on the basis of unexamined, unexplained claims by the Project’s proponents.  Unless actual delay can be demonstrated, there is NO justification for the filling of wetlands, for the expenditure of hundreds of millions of public dollars.  In this regard, it will be helpful to consider the last round of dialogue on this point -- RCAA Comments on the point in the FEIS, and the responses of the Port and FAA.  The first comment to consider is the one in which we sought to learn how "delay" was measured.

Comment II-39:  Purpose & need;  measuring delay.  It is entirely unclear from Chapter II of the DEIS which techniques were used to measure or to assess delay at Sea-Tac in the various studies mentioned.  We are aware of three different techniques, known as ATOMS, ASQP, & SIMMOD, & that they yield very different results as to delay.  But the details of each are unclear to us, & the average lay reader of the DEIS would not have a clue that there are competing measurement or assessment methods, or that different studies have produced different results.  What is measured?  Who does the measuring?  Are various causal factors considered?  reported?  Who decides whether a delay is caused by weather, by aircrew problems, by groundside problems?  What happens if one delay has multiple causes?  What happens if no one is sure what cause was?  At a minimum, the FEIS should pull up from the studies on which the lead agencies rely sufficient detail to enable the intelligent lay reader to know what was done, why, & how, to measure the delay, & to understand what the controversy is about the results reported in the DEIS, & why the DEIS & FEIS accept a particular set of figures.

(In this context, we respectfully suggest that the reviewers of the Corps are in much the same position that our review teams are & have been:  intelligent but lay readers, dependent on the 'experts' to provide accurate, understandable information.)  We thought (& still think) that our Comment II-39 was a reasonable comment, deserving of a forthcoming response.  But this is what we got:

Comments R-3-17:  The Regional Commission on Airport Affairs and Mr. Frause asked several questions concerning the definition of delay.

Response:  Aircraft delay is one measure of the operating efficiency or performance of an airport system or its various components.  It is defined as the difference between the actual time required for aircraft to pass through the system (or a component of the system, like the enroute airspace) and the optimal time achievable without constraints such as poor weather at the destination airport, lack of adequate runway or taxiway facilities, or airspace interactions with other airports.  Aircraft delay results from multiple aircraft competing for limited facilities and can be influenced by a number of factors, such as:

            ·            Ceiling and Visibility Conditions

            ·            Airfield Physical Characteristics

            ·            Air Traffic Control Procedures, and

            ·            Aircraft Operational Characteristics

When dealing with aircraft delay, it is important to understand that aircraft are often delayed at a location that is not the source of the delay.   By means of FAA Central Flow Control Procedures, aircraft are routinely held at the origin airport rather than in airspace holding patterns during periods of reduced arrival acceptance rates at the destination airport.  Accordingly, when weather conditions in Seattle [sic] preclude the use of dual approaches, aircraft destined for Sea-Tac are held either at the gate or on the airfield of the origin airport.  Such delays are often attributed to the departure from the origin airport, rather than the arrival into Sea-Tac Airport.

The metrics used to measure delay vary widely and depend on the intended use of the data.  For example, the FAA’s Air Traffic Operations System (ATOMS) is an operational and tactical planning tool used to support decisions about real time air traffic control procedures and the deployment of air traffic control personnel and other resources.  As such, ATOMS, is used to collect data on the number of flights delayed 15 minutes or more during any one of the four stages of flight:  departure, air traffic management, enroute, and arrival.  These four segments coincide with the air traffic control division of workload used throughout the National Airspace System (NAS).  For example, a flight that incurs 14.5 minutes of delay in the departure phase, 14.5 minutes of delay due to air traffic management, 14.5 minutes enroute and 14.5 in the arrival phases (a total flight delay of 58 minutes) would not be counted as a delayed flight using the ATOMS methods.  Since ATOMS was not designed to assist with decisions about airport improvements, such as the proposed new runway at Sea-Tac Airport, it does not provide useful information about the source of a particular delay, nor does it quantify the aggregate minutes of delay experienced throughout the NAS due to constraints at a particular facility.

On-time performance, as reported through Airline Service Quality Performance (ASQP), is another measure of system performance that is often confused with delay. 

So, on the basis of that response, what measure of delay was being used by the proponents, & how was delay defined?

We suggested in our Comment II-35 to the Master Plan Update DEIS that air carriers would not behave in an irrational manner by forcing peak-period flights with serious delays, but would, rather, spread their flights, compress their passenger loads, & in other ways behave sensibly.  Thus, projecting crowding & costly delays without taking into account the predictable behavior of the players was & is erroneous.  The proponents’ response to that (Response 4-7) was that demand-management alternatives were discussed in the Flight Plan EIS -- by no means the same thing! 

Our Comment II-36 suggested "that a combination of higher load factors, a modest increase in flights using the existing two-runway configuration, high-speed rail travel, technical advances, etc." would accommodate the projected boarding increases found in the Master Plan.  The Response only addressed high-speed rail, & found that non-feasible on the basis of the decision of the Expert Arbitration Panel on that point (the Panel's order of 8 December 1995).  The Response failed to notice that the reason for the Panel's conclusion was that there was no entity pushing for high-speed rail in Washington;  the Response failed to note that directly after that order was released the Department of Transportation changed position radically, & announced a whole series of initiatives for increasing high-speed rail travel -- i.e., the problem that concerned the Panel had essentially gone away.  So, we repeat:  a combination of higher load factors, a modest increase in flights using the existing set-up (20,000 per annum), increases in rail travel (especially high-speed rail), technical advances in aviation should suffice to obviate bad-weather arrival delay.  We would add that administrative measures post arrival at the Airport, aimed at speeding the departure of arriving passengers from the facility would work wonders in terms of reducing the actual delays experienced by incoming travelers.  This is the least costly way of dealing with the problem -- whatever it is.

4.4.5.    Technological Improvements Considered

The Corps must consider the use of technological improvements that will permit aircraft landings in poor weather conditions. 

Some may disagree with our analysis infra, showing that the 'delay' problem is so ill defined as to be non-existent.  But even if there is some bad-weather arrival delay, the proposed solution to it is not the appropriate one.  Other less costly and less environmentally damaging alternatives are available.

The problem, put simply, is that with the existing two major runways being only 800 feet apart, commercial aircraft cannot use both runways simultaneously and independently when aircraft are required by reason of weather to land by instrument rules.  Air-traffic controllers must treat those two runways as part of one system.  And FAA regulations do not permit two jet liners to land simultaneously in poor weather side by side, with only an 800-foot separation.  Much larger separations are required, the amount increasing as visibility worsens.  Even with flight instruments, the FAA for safety reasons requires a substantial separation, owing to the imprecision of the instruments.  The 2500-foot separation between first and third runway is the least distance that FAA will allow under unfavorable flying conditions -- hence the location of the proposed new runway.

However, the quality of flight instruments has taken a quantum leap since the inception of the third-runway project.  The best-known new technology is GPS, global positioning system.  The web of 24 Department of Defense satellites around the planet can be tapped to locate a GPS instrument with enormous precision.  The instruments are inexpensive -- ordinary hikers and mountaineers can afford to carry scaled-down versions in their backpacks.  Aircraft equipped with avigational-grade instruments are able to land safely in conditions of zero visibility, and right on the mark.  The instrumentation has been tested repeatedly, with huge success.

We included with our prior submittal a copy of the 1 September 1999 article published in the Wall Street Journal (“Airline Seeks OK on Tool to Beat Fog”).  The article describes the use of global positioning satellite technology in conjunction with navigational equipment now being provided with commercial aircraft, which permits landings in reduced visibility conditions.  This technology has been under development by the air transportation industry for several years and is now being implemented in commercial aircraft at the nation’s airports.  The article discusses its proposed use at San Francisco airport, where parallel runways are spaced only 750 feet apart, comparable to the 800-foot spacing between Sea-Tac’s runways.  The article reports an FAA operations inspector stating the technology “will be the standard cockpit equipment of the future.”  The Corps must consider utilization of this technology as an alternative to the destruction of wetlands for the runway project.

Alaska Aircraft announced as long ago as September 1996 that it would equip the 25 Boeing 737-400s in its fleet with GPS avionics, at a cost of only $10 million.  Coupled with the GPS instruments would new Enhanced Ground Warning System technology (to ensure that the arriving aircraft down exactly at the runway surface.  Once installed, of course, such instrumentation is useable everywhere.  Alaska, it may be noted, is the largest carrier by volume at Sea-Tac.  GPS will solve the bad-weather arrival problem at Sea-Tac, as soon as FAA's rules catch up with technology.

Other flight-instrumentation and control technologies are being developed that are independent of the satellite systems.  Best known is the FMS, which permits air-traffic controllers to keep aircraft in extraordinarily narrow corridors, with deviations of only a few feet from side to side.  This technology, too, is available, and like GPS will lead to new rules allowing side-by-side arrivals at distances never before thought feasible.  These technologies have advanced greatly in understanding and acceptance, even since December 1997.  The previously cited article from the Wall Street Journal refers to such additional methodologies as RNP (required navigational performance) and ground-based high-definition radar.

At the very least, these & other new technologies mean that a new runway could be built within the perimeter of the present Airport campus, & meet any bad-weather delay problem that might exist.  At best, these technologies should lead to the ability to use the two main runways at Sea-Tac as they now are with the same efficiency in poor weather as now exists in good weather.  Either way, the wetlands-filling proposal of the Applicant will not be needed.

The Corps should require a very clear explanation from the Applicant as to why a technological solution to the delay issue is not being pursued.  The Corps should conduct its own study of the issue, consulting with flight-instrument firms (Honeywell and Canadian Marconi, among others), major air carriers, airports where GPS field trials have been conducted, and so on.  For a cost far less than building the new runway (to say nothing of a new terminal and a new people-mover), the poor-weather situation can be addressed, with very little environmental damage.  We note that the comments submitted by Debi Wagner on this Application include information that the major Cleveland, Ohio, airport, with similar very-close runways, is able to handle a much greater volume of traffic than Sea-Tac.  Why is Sea-Tac unable to do what Cleveland seems to be able to do?

This is not to say that the Regional Commission on Airport Affairs believes that Sea-Tac should continue to add flights with the aid of modern technology.  We believe that the Airport is already too constrained in numerous parameters, and that our State (and the federal aviation authorities) should not put all our air-travel eggs into the over-crowded Sea-Tac basket.  But if one is to consider reasonable, available, cost-effective alternatives to a very costly and very damaging project, use of GPS, FMS, and the like simply must be considered seriously.  They have the enormous drawback, of course, that they do not require expenditure of billions of dollars.

4.5.              New Cost Benefit Analysis Needed

The original approvals for the third-runway project were based on cost-benefit work that is no longer applicable, requiring a re-examination of the claimed 'need' for the Project, and of the claimed benefits. 

Each of the Project’s proponents has given its own approval to the Project.  The Port has done so with a resolution of its Commissioners, with no independent analysis.  The FAA has done so with its “Record of Decision” (ROD), which presented a page or two recapitulating the previous undocumented claims of vast costs to airline and travelers from ‘delay’ (not defined).  Subsequent facts challenge the current validity of that FAA approval.

Since the close of the comment period on the original application, much new information about the dollar costs of the third runway has come to light.  First, it has been revealed that at the time of the application, the Port did not have enough cash in hand & grants promised to permit construction on a pay-as-you-go basis.  That meant that the Port would have to borrow money to pay its contractors.  The funding shortfalls and the costs of borrowed money were never alluded to in the EISes or the FAA’s ROD or the Port Commission’s resolution.  As of the time of the earlier application, the cost of the runway was represented as being just over $587 million.  The Port had in hand cash & grant commitments for just $180 million.

Second, we now have some real-world figures for the cost of borrowing by the Port for this Project, because the Port has now actually undertaken a partial borrowing for that purpose.  In mid-1998, the Port issued long-term debt secured by future passenger facility charges (PFCs), in part to acquire money for third-runway purposes.  On the basis of that application, RCAA performed a simple calculation, comparing amount borrowed with amount to be repaid:  the calculation shows that the Port must pay out $3.23 for each dollar borrowed.  Put in other words, to find out how much the Port must repay, multiply the amount borrowed by 323 percent.  Only part of the money from that PFCs-secured borrowing was intended for third-runway use.  The amount for that purpose was $114 million; the amount to be repaid on that sum was $369 million (principal, $114 million;  interest & other costs, $254 million).  That additional $254 million for interest &c., brought the cost of the Project to $841 million.  But the borrowing still left a shortfall of cash & other funding of $293 million. 

Third, after the issuance of the PFC bonds, it became feasible to make a fairly precise estimate of the total cost of the Project, on the basis of the stated construction price of $587 million, using the Port’s actual experience with its PFCs borrowing as a guide.  The results of that calculation show that the total unfunded $293 million in construction costs (in 1998)             would turn into a long-term obligation costing $959 million to retire, the original $293, and another $657 million in interest & other costs.  Thus, to buy a runway whose cost was estimated at $587 million, the Port would actually pay out $ 1.499 billion!  These numbers were not before the Corps when the first application was active.  They suggest that the cost-benefit analysis in the ROD was obsolete in 1999.

Fourth, in June 1999, the Port admitted to another huge increase in the projected costs of the third runway.  Staff’s June 1999 estimate was $773 million.  We note that was a 31 percent increase from the official figure of 18 months previous.  The Port Commission voted to accept those numbers.  With cost of borrowed money, the true cost thus rose to $2.1 billion.

Fifth, the 1999 increase in costs of construction necessarily implied an increase in the total outlay for costs of borrowed money.  No new grants, no new cash, had come the Port’s way.  The Port’s financial position having not improved in the interval since the PFC-backed borrowing took place, it is reasonable to suppose that the Port will have to borrow against future revenues for a term similar to that of the first PFCs bonds, & at a similar per dollar cost, to cover the cost increases reported in June 1999.  No other scenario has been proposed.  The additional construction costs of $286 million identified in June 1999 will require long-term borrowing, which will lead to an ultimate payout of over $900 milllion.  Thus, by November 1999, the true cost of the Project stood at something in the range of $2.1 to 2.2 billion.  Contrast that figure with the $587 million reported to the public and the Corps in late 1997, and one sees that all the cost-benefit work needed to be re-figured as part of the process of considering the second application. 

Sixth, since the demise of the second application, revised cost figures continue to leak out from the Port.  We are all awaiting a full, written detailing of the Port's new estimates, but we understand that the June 1999 figure of $773 has shot up by another $180 million or so.  With no funding source in sight for that money, the Port will presumably have to borrow, yet again.  Using the 3.23 factor discussed above, another $180 million in up-front costs scales out at a true cost of $581.4 million.  The public is looking at a project whose true costs to the Airport (&, ultimately, to the taxpayers and air travelers) will exceed two and a half Billion dollars – will approximate $2.6 or $2.7 Billion.

Seventh, the exercise of the PFCs borrowing, together with a host of internal Port documents obtained in the last year or two, reveal that the Port is in a serious cash-flow bind as to its capital-construction projects.  This is not a short-term deficit that can be met by short-term borrowing, or some simple ‘tweak’ of revenues.  No, the shortfall is so great that hundreds of millions (more likely billions) must be borrowed, & the terms of the borrowings must extend for decades.  This is not just for the third runway, but also for the whole array of proposed construction projects.

So, one needs to consider that with no source of funding for the new shortfalls in view, there is a very real risk that if permission were granted for this project to go ahead, the project will stall out, with the damage to wetlands accomplished but no runway constructed, &, thus, no benefit however debatable conferred on the travelling public or the airlines.

These new costs figures should impel the Corps to conduct its own thorough, independent, & credible review of the costs-benefit analysis, and of the ‘delay’ issue.

4.6.           Benefits and Costs Incongruent

The costs of this Project will not benefit those who pay them, a factor that should be borne in mind in assessing 'need'.

The issue of overall-cost, including the cost of borrowed money, is separate from the issue of how the Port might generate a revenue stream that would be an acceptable security for further bond issues.  May we assume that the Corps is aware that financial institutions will not lend large sums of money (& we’re talking hundreds upon hundreds of millions here) without some form of security?  For airports owned & operated by Port districts in Washington, there are only a very few forms of security, all of them future revenue streams, as follows:

Borne directly by the people of King County

·        tax revenues,

·        future PFCs, &

·        miscellaneous & usually minor revenues from such Port activities as parking garages, charges to concessionaires & non-airline tenants, & other even more minor sources. 

(We attribute PFCs and miscellaneous revenues to the people of King County, because studies have shown that the great bulk – though not all -- of the travelers out of the Airport are residents of King County.)

Borne directly by the airlines

Revenue from airlines (normally under their Basic Airlines Lease Agreement with the airport operator)

For cost-benefit purposes, the nature of the revenue is irrelevant, so long as it is reasonably certain:  the differences, if any, between interest rates for bonds based on one revenue stream or another, will be relatively trivial.

However, in terms of benefits to airlines & to the travelling public, there is a real difference in how the Project is funded.  The two alleged purposes of this project are (1) to confer a direct benefit on travelers by reducing their lost time while travelling to Sea-Tac, & (2) to confer a benefit on commercial air carriers by reducing their operating expenses by reducing operational time on flights to Sea-Tac.  (Whether reduced costs to airlines would result in a reduction of airfares charged to travelers is a question that seems not have occurred to FAA and the Port – at least it is not referred to in their numerous volumes of environmental review, or the FAA's Record of Decision.)  So, one asks, what benefits are to be received from the Project by the various potential funding sources; what do the prospective beneficiaries contribute to the costs of the Project?

Funding by property-tax revenues.  If the Port were to rely on its tax revenues – taxes on real property -- the funds would come out of the pockets of King County taxpayers.   There is no benefit to the taxpayers of King County, as such:  if the project is funded in whole or part by tax revenues, taxpayers as such pay a direct price & gain nothing in return:  federal statutes forbid the Port from returning to the taxpaying public any part of the profit on its airport operations.  So, every dollar of tax revenue received by the Port from the taxpayers is a net loss to them. 

Funding from PFCs; from miscellaneous Port revenues (profits on business operations).  To the extent that the Port relied on PFCs & miscellaneous revenues, the burden would fall on users of the airport – travelers, in the case of PFCs, and travelers & perhaps others in the case of the miscellaneous revenues.  If the Port were to rely on these revenues, airlines would receive (per the Port’s numbers) very large economic benefits at the expense of others.  Air travelers & taxpayers would buy the Project for the benefit of the airlines, in effect.  Under this scenario, a true costs-benefit study should be restricted to benefits to air travelers, the airlines not having contributed.

The Port has repeatedly ruled out use of tax revenues for third-runway purposes.  Its PFCs are already pledged to repay an existing bond issue, far into the next century. The Congress has recently authorized an increase in the PFCs from $3 to $4.50, but the amount of money that could be raised thereby would be woefully insufficient to pay for the $7 to $10 billion in projected capital projects.)  We have yet to see any analysis that shows that parking fees and surtaxes on espresso can pay for the Master Plan Update projects! 

Funding by increased rentals from airlines. This leaves a sharp increase in the BALA rates as the sole revenue stream available to support the sort of major bond issues required by the Project & associated construction.  Then the burden would fall in the first instance on the airlines using the Airport.  It would be pure speculation to discuss how the airlines might re-allocate those additional costs.  Not to the taxpayers of King County, surely, but perhaps to travelers from Sea-Tac.  And perhaps not.

There is an intermediate case: If additional PFCs were used, airlines would argue that they would suffer a diminution in revenue, on the generally-accepted premise that demand for air travel is extraordinarily price sensitive, ‘elastic’ in economists’ jargon.  The slightest change in airfare is said to drive with rigidity a corresponding change in travel.  (For the purposes of justifying the third runway, the Port & FAA have advanced a different economic theory: they argue that demand for air travel is completely inelastic.  According to them, on this one occasion, demand for air travel is in a direct, 1:1 proportion to overall economic activity.  Under this theory, the Port can jack up its airline rentals to any level at all, the airlines will jack up their ticket prices accordingly, & the travelling public will come in the same numbers as always.  This might be true for governmental entities like the FAA and Port, but most corporate controllers will not authorize big increases in travel expenses in budgets already adopted.  It is much more likely that a big increase in airfare will lead to a sharp diminution in business air travel to & from Seattle.  Where is the benefit for the scheduled airlines from such a development?

Further, if the airlines’ view of airline economics is correct, as opposed to the governmental view, a diminution in revenue occasioned by an increase in PFCs would eat into the economies of scale that are essential for airline profitability.  The Port and FAA have failed to present any analysis of whether putative gains from faster arrival might not be eaten up by losses in profitability resulting from decreased demand for travel.

In conducting its own review, the Corps should be cognizant of the expressed opinion of several major airline users of the Airport – this is not new information, but it is increasingly relevant as the true costs of the Project, & additional information controverting the notion of big delays, come to light.  Commenting adversely on the proposal to use new PFC charges for third-runway purposes, airlines had the following to say:

"United disputes the assertion that a third runway 'is necessary to eliminate a seven minute average delay at the airport' and asserts that 'none of that delay is attributable to the lack of the third runway, but a number of other factors.'  United is of the opinion that 'the airport's estimate that a third runway will provide $60 million of operational savings is not supportable using standard business calculations.' "

"TWA -- in concert with Delta and United -- believes that extending the Runway 16L-16R Safety area, 'instead of building a third runway -- is the best alternative to address capacity issues caused by warm weather and Pacific operations.' "

The Corps should also be cognizant of the results of a recent study done for National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) of major U.S. airports with parallel runways (including Seattle).  This study was not available to the public or to the Corps before the close of the comment period on the first application.  The study was partly funded by FAA (at the top level), & FAA did not register a dissent from its conclusions.  The study analyzed arrival delays at the airports included in its scope.  What was its report on Sea-Tac?  "Arrival delay factors:  None."  May we suggest that a study done for independent reasons for an outside agency necessarily has a lot more credibility than a study done by a project proponent for the purpose of justifying a project?

If, as RCAA has concluded (along with NASA, & several user airlines), that there is no demonstrable ‘delay’, or if at the most there is some delay, but not ‘delay’ that cannot be compensated for by administrative measures, the permit should not issue, regardless of conditions that might be imposed on it, for a showing of need will not have been made.

If, as RCAA has concluded, the cost-benefit analysis will not stand up in light of the newly revealed true costs of the Project to the Port, the Corps should deny a permit, for a showing of need will not have been made.

4.7.           Offsite Impacts

The permit should be denied because of the failure of the Application and the Proponents to provide adequate mitigation of offsite impacts.

Some of those offsite impacts are obviously environmental, & clearly within the purview of the Corps and Ecology:  impacts on Miller and Des Moines Creeks outside the Port’s acquisition area (which includes most of the construction area).  Those impacts include increased contaminants in the waters of the Creeks from construction activities, & from continuation & expansion of Airport activities upstream; silting & sedimentation downstream; flooding downstream, with risks of bank erosions (& consequent loss of property values); harm to stream-side natural habitat; harm to endangered species and candidate species; release of contaminants & sedimentation into Puget Sound.  We will discuss these in detail below.

Other offsite impacts are more indirect, & for them no mitigation is proposed.  Operation of a new runway will bring over flights of jet-engine aircraft directly overhead in areas where there have not been such flights in the past.  This will result in new adverse noise impacts, new air pollution (& consequent new water contamination) from jet-engine exhausts, & a host of corollary negative impacts.  Until adequate mitigation is proposed for these impacts (& until the public has had a reasonable opportunity to comment on the mitigation proposals), the permit should be denied.  We made this point in these exact words in our comments on the second application.  Unsurprisingly, the Proponents have offered nothing since then to deal with these adverse impacts.

To lend specificity to the foregoing, we note that a prior independent study of potential adverse impacts from the third runway conducted by Thomas Lane Associates in 1997 reported that every instructional building in the Highline School District would likely need major noise insulation work, were a third runway to become operational.  The cited study did not extend to the Seattle School District.  However, a glance at the maps will show that there are schools in the Seattle system as close to the new third-runway flight corridors as the Highline schools, schools also likely to require serious mitigation.  Yet, the Applicant makes no proposal to mitigate these impacts.  The silence of the Applicant on the question of third-runway impacts offsite should require denial of the permit at this time.

We incorporate comments dated February 9, 2001 submitted by Thomas Lane Associates on behalf of the Airport Communities Coalition which address issues raised in the above mentioned 1997 study, analyzes the indirect impacts of the proposed Sea-Tac expansion project on the local and surrounding communities, and challenges the Port's assertion that the proposed project would not have detrimental economic or social impacts on the local communities.

4.8            Environmental Justice

Executive Order 12898 by its terms applies to this proceeding.  Applicant has made no showing that its Project will not have disparate environmental impacts within the scope of the Order.  That omission alone should be sufficient to require the Corps to deny the permit.

Consideration, at even the most rudimentary level, of facts known to all will require the conclusion that there are unusually high concentrations of people within the protected classes defined in the Executive Order under the new third-runway flight corridors.  So, assuming that there is NOT an affirmative burden on all applicants for Section 404 permit to make a showing of compliance with the Order, there is still ground here to require such a showing.  Those facts may be summarized as follows:

The midline of the new runway will be located 2500 feet West of the midline of the existing most easterly runway, in order to achieve a separation of 2500 feet between flights using those two runways.  This new midline falls on 12^th Ave. So.  The new runway will be parallel with the existing runways, which means that aircraft will fly north-south routes while leaving and arriving at that runway, just as they do for the existing runways.  This will bring new flight corridors directly overhead to the West of the flight corridors now serving the second runway (which is 800 feet to the West of the first runway).  If operated as advertised, arrivals will come in over Seattle and the unincorporated parts of White Center about one-third of a mile farther West than at present, and departures will leave in a corridor about one-third of a mile farther to the West over Burien, Des Moines, & Federal Way than at present.  If the third runway is operated for both departures AND arrivals (there are no known legal barriers to such operation), the newly impacted areas will experience both arrivals and departures.  It is generally held that departures cause greater noise impacts than arrivals, though both are considered to be intrusive.

Under existing FAA flight procedures for Sea-Tac, which are likely to remain in place with a third runway in operation (because of constraints of operational features of commercial airliners, considerations of efficient management of air space, and constraints of topography), departing aircraft will fly in a straight North-South line for at least 5.75 statute miles from the South end of the runways before deviating East or West.  (The Port and FAA, for their own reasons, measure these distances in nautical miles, i.e., 6076.115 feet – or 1852 meters.  A nautical mile is 15.077936 percent longer that a statute mile.  To arrive at distance figures that are meaningful to the public, & that can be used with existing maps, one needs to multiply the Proponents’ mileage figures by 0.86899.)  The earliest permissible turning point corresponds to the North end of Beacon Hill, in Seattle.

A glance at a Seattle-area street map, using a straight edge on 12^th So. shows that the noise foot print, whether arrivals or departures, would move westerly into South Park and White Center if the third runway were to come into use.  It is common knowledge that South Park has a very high proportion of foreign-born (Mexican) residents, & that White Center has a very high proportion of Korean immigrants.  The noise footprint would also move so that the centerline would be farther West over Georgetown & on Beacon Hill, increasing noise in those two communities.  It is well known that Georgetown has a high proportion of elderly and of low-income residents.  It is well known that Beacon Hill has a very high proportion of foreign-born residents and residents who are in defined and protected ethnic minorities.  Assuming arrivals-only usage, the north-south third-runway footprint would move farther West on Capitol Hill, including areas with disproportionate numbers of elderly, handicapped, & low income residents.  The midline of the third-runway arrival corridor would be right down the middle of the campus of Seattle University.  Further demographic information is readily obtainable (& more & more protected persons will come to light the more demographic research is done).  These various neighborhoods are under the protection of the Executive Order.  The Port knows these facts.  They are known to the FAA.  But nothing is said about them.  The Corps should reject the permit out of hand for its failure to disclose the facts that it should include for the Corps’ consideration in light of the Executive Order.

4.9.              The Corps must conduct a Clean Air Act conformity analysis

The requirement for a conformity analysis is triggered here because the project is located in an area that has been designated as a "non-attainment area" and later redesigned as a "maintenance area" for Carbon Monoxide and Ozone. See, 42 U.S.C. 7505(c)(5)(B).  Review of the FAA's record of decision (ROD) confirms that the only conformity analysis performed to date concerning this application was conducted by the FAA in 1997.  However, the FAA's ROD explains that it's "draft conformity analysis" and subsequent "quality assurance process "projected air quality emissions levels would fall below the de minimis levels under the Clean Air Act. ROD at 23.  40 CFR 93.154 requires that any federal agency taking an action "must make its own conformity determination consistent with the requirements of this subpart." Here the Corps is taking "Federal action."  The regulations also explicitly require that "analyses required under this subpart must be based on the latest planning assumptions." 40 CFR 93.159(a).  Clearly the major changes that have occurred in the scope of the Port's Master Plan projects over the course of the past five years discussed infra, warrant both an air quality conformity analysis in addition to a supplemental environmental impact statement. The results of the conformity analysis must be made available to the public for review and comment.

5.     FACTORS REQUIRING RETURN OF APPLICATION FOR FURTHER WORK

5.1.           Return of Application for Further Work

We have argued in Part IV above that there are numerous critical flaws in the Application that mandate a denial of the sought-for permit.  Some might suggest that certain of these flaws might be dealt with by returning the Application for further work, rather than denying the permit outright.  The two areas that logically suggest themselves for further work are discussed below.

5.2.           Missing Documents

Numerous documents necessary to an understanding of the Project, and of the Application, are missing.  We have detailed these problems in sec. 2.3 infra.  If the Corps holds that the missing documents are not so grave a flaw as to require outright denial of the permit, then the Corps should at the least return the Application for further work, including a full listing of ALL relevant documents.

5.3.           Inadequate Analysis

Just as there are numerous missing documents, there are numerous missing analyses.  Many failings in the analytical work are detailed in sections of Part IV.  We suggest that the Applicant has had all the time in the world to do its work correctly, and in fact has already had the benefit of two 'dress rehearsals', so the appropriate method of dealing with the present situation is to deny the permit outright.

While it is the view of RCAA that inadequate analysis is a sufficient ground for outright denial of the permit, we are aware that others might take a different view, i.e., that the Applicant should be given an opportunity to correct the flaws in its work.  If that is the view of the Corps, we suggest that a written order be issued, detailing the flaws to be corrected, & remanding the matter to the Applicant for further work.  Each of the flaws referred to in Part IV infra needs significant additional study, new documentation, and the result, of course, should be a new Notice and a new hearing or hearings.  So much has changed since this matter began in 1989 -- so much has changed since 1997 -- that the proceeding should start fresh, not as a revised application.

6.          CONDITIONS THAT SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON APPLICANT IF PERMIT IS GRANTED

In the event that the permit is granted, conditions must be included that will mitigate the impacts of the project on the surrounding environment.  Because of the uncertain scope of the project, a revised assessment of impacts will be necessary to evaluate a mitigation program that addresses all of the impacts.

An independent consultant should perform such an assessment of mitigation requirements.  If the permit is granted, the Corps should require an independent study to determine the impacts and recommend a program with associated costs for implementation of the mitigation program.

Consultation with the local municipalities and public-education districts must be a necessary requirement in determining the parameters of the mitigation program.

Another condition that should be imposed in the event that a permit is issued is the establishment of an independent team for oversight of both Port construction activities and the mitigation program recommended by the independent mitigation study.  The Port should provide funding for this group but the Corps or another body other than the Port must administer the program.  The independent panel should include representation from the ACC cities and communities.

To assure that the Port provides adequate mitigation for the project the Corps should require that the Port fund the mitigation program through a special account established specifically for the mitigation program.

Certain issues appear to us be addressed inadequately in the paperwork submitted to date: Aesthetics; landscaping; security of the newly expanded campus; very obviously, noise (more requirements are needed to ensure for the impacts of noise.  Insulation of impacted homes); ground vibration.

Most evident of all is the need for the most stringent conditions to protect water quality, including mitigation for impacts of increased stormwater flows, which must be assessed and included in the permit.  We would encourage the Corps to conduct further consultations, if a permit-grant decision is made, among all interested parties both governmental and non-governmental, on this point.

7.     CONCLUSION

There have been many changes in the Port of Seattle’s proposed third runway project since the public hearings held by the Corps of Engineers in April 1998 and November 1999.  The financial, social, and environmental costs of the Project have grown significantly and show no sign of decreasing.  A proposed gradual earthen embankment has now changed to a steep 130 – 150 -foot high wall raising serious safety concerns with both the seismic stability of the wall and the magnification of updrafts and downdrafts from the wall causing wind shear in the path of aircraft departing and landing adjacent to the wall.  ESA issues have arisen.  There are, however, many issues that have not changed since the Port’s most recent application.  Water discharging from Port property still continues to violate federal and State water quality standards.  The Port still is proposing to use local streams and waters of the state as its own wastewater disposal system.  The Port is still requesting a Clean Water Act Section 401 certification prior to the issuance of water quality criteria for Miller, Walker, and Des Moines Creeks.  Finally, it is still true that the Port of Seattle has failed to provide a meaningful assessment of the benefits of the third runway project or adequate information allowing the Corps of Engineers and Ecology to conclude there is reasonable assurance the proposed project will comply with the Clean Water Act. 

For the foregoing reasons and the reasons cited in the aforementioned comments, the Corps of Engineers should deny the Port’s permit application.